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I. Introduction 
Capital markets rely on credible financial accounting information. Good 
quality in financial reporting helps investor to better assess firm value and 
performance and to make improved investment decisions. Financial 
scandals in the United States and Europe (like Enron, Worldcom, and 
Parmalat) have highlighted the importance of financial reporting quality, 
with a special emphasis on earnings quality.  
Due to the strong relationship between earnings quality and the financial 
scandals happened in the last ten years, earnings management has become a 
pressing issue in accounting academic debate and in practice. The corporate 
scandals of the late 1990s and the early 2000s, in United States and in 
Europe, were arguably the result of some extreme form of earnings 
management activity1.  
Previous researches have shown that managers engage in earnings 
management for various reasons and the proclivity of management to 
manipulate earnings information has increased over time (Brown, 2001; 
Lopez and Rees, 2001; Barton et al., 2002). Several evidences indicate that 
earnings manipulation has become widespread. Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2004), for example, in a survey on 401 CFO asked the following 
question: “Near the end of the quarter, it looks like your company might 
come in below the desired earnings target. Within what is permitted by 
GAAP, which the following choice might your company make?”. They find 
80 percent of CFOs saying that their companies are willing to delay 
                                                
1 Earnings management is a phenomenon clearly defined from the academic literature: 
“…earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Haley and Wahlen, 1999). The 
extreme form of earnings management (financial fraud), instead, is defined from the 
professional literature as: “…the deliberate misrepresentation of the financial condition of 
the enterprise accomplished through the intentional misstatement or omission of amount or 
disclosures in the financial statement to deceive financial statement users”(Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 1993). Both earnings management and fraud have the same intention to device 
investors. The difference is in the meaning: while “management” is usually within GAAP 
fraud deviates from this.  
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discretionary spending such as R&D, advertising and maintenance, and over 
55 percent saying that their company would knowingly sacrifice a small 
value by delaying the start of projects. Almost 40 percent would book 
revenues now, rather than next quarter, or provide incentives for customer 
to by now. The reasons for earnings management are different and range 
from the intention to satisfy analysts’ expectations, to realize bonuses (so, 
reasons related to compensation issue), to maintain competitive position 
within the financial market, or reasons related to a new company’s 
acquisition.  
Jensen in 2005 theoretically introduced hypotheses about the overvalued 
companies. In Jensen’s argument, managers of overvalued companies face 
two options. First, the manager can communicate to the market that he can 
not deliver the expected operating performance to justify the inflated stock 
price either by telling the market outright or by waiting until the next 
reporting date and, then, they report a negative performance surprise. This 
option has potential to negative affect the manager’s compensation and 
career. The second option, instead, includes action to inflate reported 
performance to try to justify the inflated stock price. Such actions could be 
overinvesting through acquisitions or expansions, commitment of frauds, 
and managing earnings. By doing so, the manager hopes to delay the 
negative compensation and career consequences, destroying substantial 
shareholder value in the long run. 
According to Jensen’s prediction, as a firm becomes more overvalued the 
pressure to meet increasingly unrealistic earnings targets becomes greater, 
encouraging managers to act in a ways that are detrimental in the long run 
value of their firms. 
Based on this theoretical framework and on previous empirical studies done 
in this field, the present research is organized around the following 
questions: Is there any relation between firm’s market valuation and 
earnings management? Do the managers of overvalued (undervalued) 
companies have strong incentive to continue overvaluation (undervaluation) 
engaging in earnings management?  
 
 
 7 
Following Houmes and Skantz (2010) we assume as basic idea that market 
price drives reported earnings opposed to the standard model where reported 
earnings drives market price. We hypothesize that there will be a positive 
relation between firm’s market value and earnings management and, in 
particular, that in case of increasing in firm’s market value managers have 
the incentive to engage in income-increasing earnings management.  
We also hypothesize that managers of companies characterized by a 
decreasing in firm’s market value engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management, demonstrating that managers of undervalue companies may 
sustain the undervaluation to help themselves through accounting 
manipulation to correct accounting trickery. 
As primary test, we regress the change in total accruals from year t-1 to year 
t on factors known to be associated with accruals (firm size, leverage and 
company’s performance) and change in firm’s market valuation from year t-
1 to year t (measured through market-to-book ratio).  
We find that an increase in firm’s market value (overvaluation) is associated 
with income-increasing earnings management (measured considering 
positive change in total accruals) and, a decreasing in firm’s market value 
(undervaluation) is associated with income-decreasing earnings 
management (measured considering negative change in total accruals). The 
first finding empirically demonstrates the validity of the Jensen’s hypothesis 
of the overvalued company in the Italian market.  
Instead, the positive relation between a decreasing in firm’ s market value 
and income-decreasing earnings management represents, in our opinion, the 
managers’ incentive in correcting previous upward accrual manipulation, 
avoiding to engage in the extreme case of earnings management (non-
GAAP earnings management) that is likely to imply accounting frauds 
(related to Badertscher (2010) study about the choice of alternative earnings 
management mechanism).  
  
Another set of test examines the robustness of the primary results. In 
particular, we run the analysis considering different sample composition in 
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order to verify if the primary finding could be driven by different time series 
analysis. This robustness check allows, at the same time, to control for the 
possible bias in the results due to the IFRS introduction in 2005.  
The second and most important test is related to the possible bias due to the 
effect of sales growth in the primary test. As we will explain, the primary 
test could be influenced by sales growth that may have an impact on both 
dependent (change in total accruals from year t-1 to year t) and independent 
(change in firm’s market value from year t-1 to year t) variables. To control 
for this possible bias, we develop the empirical analysis considering change 
in discretionary accruals (as estimated through Jones model (1991)) as 
dependent variables rather than change in total accruals.  
Our study provides useful information on the relation between firm’s market 
value and earnings management and makes several contributions to the 
literature.  
First, most researches so far have been carried out using US data. To our 
knowledge no one study has been conducted considering insider system 
countries that differ from the US (or UK) one. In this study, we provide 
evidence on the relation under analysis for the Italian market with the 
ambition to extend the empirical analysis to other European countries in 
order to verify if our findings could be generalized to others insider system 
(such as, Germany, France, Spain, etc…etc…). 
Second, the study investigates a highly significant and yet under-researched 
segment of the economy. It will contribute to the agency costs of overvalued 
equity literature framework looking into the broad issue of the complex 
interaction between firm’s market overvaluation (undervaluation) and 
earnings management direction, analysing both income-increasing and 
income-decreasing phenomena. The evidence and the potential results of the 
study could be relevant in order to understand how managers play earnings 
management “game” considering different capital market structure from the 
US one and, in which extant it is important to improve the efficiency of 
securities markets in order to protect investor’ interest.  
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The remainder of the research is organized as following. In section II the 
paper reviews the literature; in section III we develop our hypothesis. In 
section VI we briefly introduce the Italian institutional contest. Section V 
explains the sample, data and the variables used in the empirical analysis, 
while section VI explains the regression models and provides the descriptive 
statistics. Section VII illustrates the empirical results and in section VIII we 
conclude. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Classical and behavioural finance theory overview 
1.1. Classical finance theory 
Traditional finance theory stands directly on the notion of the “rationale 
man”. The rational construct assumes that individuals, both investors and 
managers, are “capable of understanding vastly complex puzzles and 
conduct endless instantaneous optimizations” (Montier, 2002). 
On average, these people make unbiased decisions and maximize their self-
interest. Any individual who makes suboptimal decisions would be 
punished through poor outcomes. Over time, people would either learn to 
make better decisions or leave the marketplace. Also, any mistake that 
market participants make are not correlated with each other; thus the 
mistakes do not have the strength to affect market prices (Baker and 
Nofsinger, 2010).  
This rationality of market participants feed into one of the classic theories of 
standard finance, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). The efficient 
market hypothesis has been the cornerstone theory on market behaviour 
since Eugen Fama has developed it in the 1960s till the 1990s, when the 
behavioural finance started emerging with the emphasis on psychology and 
behavioural principle of market participants. E. Fama (1965) describes the 
efficient market as “a market where there are large numbers of rational 
profit-maximizes actively competing, with each trying to predict future 
market values of individual securities, and where important current 
information is almost freely available to all participants”. Under this 
assumption there is no speculation in the markets, if everyone is rational. 
The only difference among the investors is the information that is available 
for them – there will be no trade if there will be no information, that is, the 
reason to trade. This causes the market values floating around the real or 
fundamental values.  
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The basic idea of the theory is that “a capital market is said to be efficient if 
prices in the market fully reflect available information. When this condition 
is satisfied, market participants can not earn an economic profit on the 
basis of available information” (Levich, 2001).  
The rational market participants have impounded all known information and 
probabilities concerning uncertainty about the future into current prices. 
Therefore, market prices are generally right. Changes in prices are therefore 
due to the short-term realization of information. In the long term, these 
prices changes, or returns, reflect compensation for taking risk. According 
to Shiller (2008) the simplest version of EMH implies that the true value of 
the stock equals the present value of optimally discounted future dividends. 
So, we can see the price as a forecast of future dividends of the stock. Of 
course not all companies pay dividends, but theoretically they should be 
paying at some point, otherwise their shares would not have value – 
investors would not like to give any away money for share without 
receiving any return in the future. People are looking for future income and 
stock prices go up if there is information about future dividends or earnings. 
Following the EMH it could be said, according to Shiller, that for example 
if the Price to Earnings ratio of the stock is low, something negative is 
expected to happen to the company’s earnings or dividends in the future. 
Therefore a low Price to Earnings ratio can be seen as a forecast of bad 
company results in the future.  
According to Elton et al. (2003), the stock market crash of 1987 was one of 
the major events to raise doubts in EMH as it was totally not in line what 
with the theory states. The EMH postulates that there is no point in trying to 
seek profits higher then those of the market itself, because all the new 
information is already incorporated in the prices. Most analysts agree that 
the information that flow nowadays is much more efficient, than for 
example in 1929 when the Great Depression started, which implies that the 
market should be more efficient in the modern times and would not achieve 
such high volatility as in 1929. Indeed it would be naïve to think that it is 
possible to beat the market after getting information from weekly or even 
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daily newspaper when due to the technological advance the trading 
nowadays is performed in a matter of seconds. Nevertheless, the stock 
market crashes of 1929 as well as a recent one in 2008-2009 show that there 
are factors causing market inefficiency and it makes the market 
untrustworthy which is against the whole idea of EMH where the market 
participant should ideally stick to the market portfolio to optimize the 
returns. 
 
The following section reviews the literature on market inefficiency to 
examine whether behavioural biases influence managerial and investor 
actions. We provide some evidence that the existence of the perfect market 
efficiency is not fully realistic to be proven in the economic world.  
 
 
1.2. Market inefficiencies 
Baruch Lev in his last book (Winning Investor Over, 2012) asks the 
following question: Can stock price in large and active capital markets 
deviate from business fundamentals over sustained period?. He wrote: “ no, 
say ardent believers in capital market efficiency”. He pointed out that the 
capital market efficiency is a state in which securities price essentially 
reflect all publicly available valuation-relevant information (earnings, 
growth potential, competitive position) without systematic biases or 
pronounced investor sentiments (optimism and pessimism). Individual 
investors, may, of course, over- or underprice securities, such mispricing 
will be quickly identified and offset by sophisticated arbitrageurs in search 
of gains from investors’ mistakes, thereby reverting prices to intrinsic 
values (Lev, 2012). Mispricing, goes the efficient markets doctrine, is an 
isolated, temporary phenomenon.  
In this section we provide a review of the most important studies about the 
empirical evidence showing markets inefficiencies.  
The contrarian investors in the long run see the low Price to Earnings, Price 
to Book Value, Price to Cash Earnings and other financial ratios as an 
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indication that the stock is undervalued and that in the future it will regain 
the true value or what is called their intrinsic, fundamental value. It is 
contradictory to classical view that assets are priced rationally in the market 
and that high price measures signal a persistent strong expected 
performance of such securities.  
Market analysis related to contrarian investor can be traced back to Basu 
(1977) that investigated the performance of US stocks based on their Price 
to Earnings (P/E) ratio. He concludes that over the 14 years period of 1957-
1971, the stocks with lower P/E ratio earn higher absolute and risk-adjusted 
rates of return than the stocks with higher P/E. Assuming that his model 
were correct such finding was one of the first indication about the 
inefficiency in the markets. The P/E information was not fully absorbed by 
the market, therefore creating disequilibrium and an opportunity to invest 
and gain an abnormal profit.  
The US market analysis by Lakonishok (1994) incorporates more financial 
ratios of the past performance of securities. In addition to Earnings to Price 
(E/P), they use Book to Market (B/M), Cash Flow to Price (C/P), and Past 
Growth of Sales (GS) measures. Over the 22 years period 1968-1990, they 
find that stock value portfolios (the ones with higher E/P, B/M, C/P, and 
lower G/S) outperform the growth stock portfolios, which they also called 
“glamour portfolios”. Moreover, they do not find differences in fundament 
risk portfolios. Set aside the risk and the data snooping bias explanations, 
the authors conclude that the market participants make judgmental errors 
and overestimate the expectation on the returns of growth portfolio based on 
their good ratios of past performance. Lakonishok and Chan review their 
findings in 2004 and they come back to the same conclusions as in 1994. 
Chan et al. (1991), provides similar findings for the stock market in Japan as 
for the US and especially large value premium is observed for portfolios 
sorted by Price to Book Value Ratio – over 1% per month.  
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 2006) introduce some 
empirical contradictions to the classical Capital Assets Pricing Model 
(CAPM).  They mention size effect, meaning that market capitalization 
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having an extra impact on returns together with β . Their findings contradict 
to the fact that over the period of 1963-1990 the average security returns are 
related to market fundamental risk β . In particular, Fama and French 
(1992) find evidence for both size and B/M effects-firms with low market 
capitalizations and high book equity value relative to market equity earns 
significantly higher return than that predicted by the CAPM. They conclude 
that the variation in market returns can be associated with the size factor, 
Earnings to Price, Book to Market and leverage ratios. Banz (1981) 
documented that small-capitalization firms listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) earned significantly higher return than those predicted by 
the CAPM. 
Moreover, Fama and French (1998) examine 13 markets outside the US, 
specifically Europe, Asia and Australia and conclude that for the period 
1975 to 1995, the value premium can be found in twelve of the thirteen 
markets and that the value premium for the global portfolio is more that 7% 
per year. Again they conclude that CAPM cannot explain the value 
premium and the authors argue that the value premium comes due to risk 
not picked up by the model. The conclusions are based on evidence that 
there is common variation in the earnings of distressed firms that is not 
explained by market earnings, and there is common variation the returns on 
distressed stocks that is not explained by the market return.  
Several practitioners, such as Kellogg and Kellogg (1991), argue that 
managers of publicly traded firms manipulate reported earnings to increase 
the firm’s stock price. The literature provides some evidences about that 
phenomenon. Rangan (1998) investigates the earnings management 
phenomenon and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. In 
particular, he investigates whether earnings management around the time of 
the offering can explain a portion of the poor performance. His findings 
provide evidence that earnings management around the offerings reliably 
predict subsequent stock returns for a sample of 230 seasoned equity 
offerings in the year 1987-1990. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
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earnings management during the year around the offering is associated with 
a decline in the market-adjusted returns in the following year of about 10%.   
Sloan (1996) finds that stock prices do not reflect the differential persistence 
of accruals and cash flows. Investor tend to overweight accruals relative to 
the cash flow when forming future expectations only to be systematically 
surprised when accruals (cash flows) turn out, in the future, to be less 
(more) persistent than expected. As a result, low-accruals firms earn 
positive abnormal returns in the future. Cooper, Gulen and Schiller (2008) 
find that assets growth rates are strong predictors of future abnormal returns 
even after controlling for book-market ratios, firm capitalization, lagged 
returns and accruals.  
Other form of the violation of the EMH lies in investor reaction to the news 
events. Event studies show that market reactions are no longer as efficient 
as they seemed to be in the short run. Ball and Brown (1968) show that after 
firm announced their earnings, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
continue to drift up for “good news” firms and down for “bad news” firms, 
suggesting that the market does not react completely at the time of 
announcement earnings. In the same field, market inefficiency also includes 
investor reaction to other corporate news events. Ritter 1991 find that initial 
public offerings (IPOs) significantly underperform relative to a set of 
comparable firms matched on size and industry. By investing in a sample of 
IPOs, investors would have earned around 17% less than investors in 
matching firms.  
Baker and Nofsinger (2010) after a wide review on the empirical studies 
testing market inefficiencies conclude, in their book, that “for markets to be 
efficient, investors need to be rational. If they are not rational, their biases 
need to be uncorrelated. If their biases are uncorrelated, rational 
arbitrageurs need to be able to take large offsetting traders to restore the 
market to efficiency”. They demonstrate that investor biases are systematic 
and predictable. Limits to arbitrageurs cannot take advantage of these biases 
and restore market efficiency.  
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In the next section we provide a review of the main framework of the 
behavioural finance theory as opposed to the traditional finance theory. 
 
1.3. Behavioural Finance Theory  
Although the traditional finance paradigm is appealing from a market-level 
perspective, it entails an unrealistic burden on human behaviour (Baker and 
Nofsinger, 2010). The behavioural finance ideas started emerging in the 
early 1990s opposing the Efficient Market Hypothesis with research based 
on the judgment and decision making process of the participants of the 
financial markets. Thaler (1993) called behavioural finance as “simply 
open-minded finance”. What makes behavioural finance theory different 
from the classical finance theory is that it is not only based on mathematical 
calculus, but it applies all other social sciences and psychology, sociology 
and anthropology, political science or, since recently, neuroscience. The 
main ideas of this discipline were inspired by the breakthrough studies by 
psychologist Kahneman and Tversky on human biased and cognitive errors, 
which later developed to what is called prospect theory. In his book, Shefrin 
(2000) describes how these early psychological papers influenced the field 
of finance.  
The prospect theory is an alternative theory to the classical expected utility 
theory, describing the decision making process under risk. The expected 
utility theory, developed by Neumann and Morgenstern in the 1940s, states 
that while making a decision people look at the final states of wealth they 
can end up with. According to prospect theory, when the stakes are small 
relative to investor’s wealth, investors do not think in term of wealth, they 
think in terms of what might be gained or lost. Moreover, people’s attitude 
to gain and loss are different. The prospect theory suggests that people look 
at the change of wealth relative to some reference point, which may vary 
from situation to situation and display loss aversion (Sheifer, 2000). So, 
prospect theory implies the use of a reference point against which investors 
would code their gains and losses.  
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Following the rationale proved by numerous experiments of Kahneman and 
Tversky, people are willing to risk more than facing losses. In the stock 
market this can be seen when market participants do not sell stocks when 
stock prices are falling in order to avoid or postpone losses and otherwise 
try to sell the winning stocks too early, without exploiting them to the end 
(Tvede, 1999). This often leads the results that are not in line with the best 
interest of investors.  
Another important finding coming from the prospect theory and many 
experiments by Tversky and Kahneman is that people are overconfident 
about their abilities. When the markets are booming and everyone is earning 
money, people tend to attribute these achievements to their own ability to 
choose a winning stock. Moreover, when individuals get confident they 
trade more then they should and lose huge amount due to costs. Odean and 
Barber (2000) find that individual households in the US which trade at the 
highest rate on average earn 6% less than the market portfolio and this 
underperformance can be explained by overconfidence. According to Shiller 
(2000) overconfidence is one of the main factors why high trading volumes 
can be observed in the markets.  
Finally, as already said before, following the efficient market hypothesis the 
prices should reflect their fundamental value. This means that there are no 
discrepancies in the pricing of securities and therefore no chance to earn 
excess adjusted profits in the markets. Behavioural finance theory argues 
against it, stating that there might be situations in the market where prices 
do not reflect their fundamental values and these are caused by the markets’ 
participants which are driven by the investor sentiment and they are 
irrational. The longstanding classical view is that the deviations from 
fundamental value are very quickly fixed by the rational traders in the 
market – whenever a deviation from fundamental value appears the rational 
traders spot the good opportunity to invest and quickly use this opportunity 
bringing the price back to its fundamentals or correcting the mispricing. The 
behavioural finance does not agree with the first part of this situation that 
the deviation from the fundamental price is always a good investment 
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opportunity (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). They argue “even when an asset is 
wildly mispriced, strategies designed to correct the mispricing can be both 
risky and costly, rendering them unattractive. As a results, the mispricing 
can remain unchallenged” (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
Since behavioural finance has been developed several studies empirically 
demonstrated its prediction. In the next section we propose a review of the 
main studies analysing the cases in which the market prices do not reflect 
their fundamentals values. The investors’ sentiment stream of literature is 
the main theoretical framework on this topic. 
 
 
1.4. Investors’ Sentiment 
The market efficiency hypothesis states that securities prices always reflect 
available information. As already shown in the previous section, over the 
last decade that paradigm has come under attack. Shleifer (2000), Barberis 
and Thaler (2001), Hirshleifer (2001) summarize three related stands of 
literature. First, theoretical work argues that arbitrage has limited 
effectiveness. Second, experimental evidence shows that agents hold beliefs 
that are not completely correct and/or make choices that are normatively 
questionable. Finally, empirical work documents phenomena where prices 
almost certainly deviate from fundamental value. Researchers in 
behavioural finance have been working to augment the standard model with 
alternative model.  
The first assumption of these models is that investor is subject to sentiment. 
Investor sentiment, defined broadly, is a belief about future cash flows and 
investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2006). The second assumption is that betting against sentimental 
investors is costly and risky.  
A pioneering and well-known set of studies of sentiment and aggregate 
stock returns appeared in the 1980s. They were largely a-theoretical, testing 
in various ways whether the stock market as a whole could be mispriced 
(some recent empirical evidences of the stock market mispricing is going to 
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be shown in section 1.5). Authors looked for: the tendency of aggregate 
returns to mean revert; volatility in aggregate stock index return that could 
not be justified by volatility in fundamentals, which is in fact another way of 
characterising mean reversion in returns; or predictability of aggregate 
returns using simple valuation ratios like the ratio of aggregate dividends to 
stock market value. In all these studies, the role of sentiment was implicit, 
and the statistical evidence was not usually very strong. Even when 
statistical inferences seemed robust, the economic interpretation was still 
unclear (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Predictability of stock returns could 
reflect the correction of sentiment-induced mispricing or, arguably, time-
varying risk or risk aversion that causes time variation in expected returns. 
The more recent studies (such as Polk and Sapienza, 2002; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2003; Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Bergman and Roychwdhry, 2008; 
Billet et al., 2010), utilize interim advances in behavioural finance theory to 
provide sharper tests for the effect of sentiment. In particular, in the many 
behavioural models of securities markets inspired by De Long et al. (1990), 
investor are two types: rational arbitrageurs who are sentiment free and 
irrational traders prone to exogenous sentiment. They compete in the market 
and see the expected returns, but arbitrageurs are limited in various ways. 
These limits come from short horizons or costs and risk of trading of short 
selling. So, prices are not always at their fundamental values. In such 
models mispricing arises out of the combination of two factors: a change in 
sentiment of the part of the irrational traders, and a limit to arbitrage from 
the rational ones (Baker and Wurgler, 2006).  
Polk and Sapienza (2002) empirically tested the real effect of investor 
sentiment. In their model, benevolent managers of overvalued companies 
invest in project with negative net present value and managers of 
undervalued companies forego projects with positive net present value. 
Empirically they found a positive relation between investment and a number 
of proxies for mispricing, controlling for investment opportunities and 
financial slack, suggesting that overpriced (underpriced) firms tend to 
overinvest (underinvest). In particular, in their model managers with private 
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information about the quality of the firm’s investment may invest 
inefficiently on behalf of shareholders. The reason is that investment 
decision serve as a signal of firm’s value and can be used to manipulate 
stock prices to shareholders’ advantage. If firm are mispriced, inefficient 
investment can be predict with ex-ante variables. In their empirical part they 
show that variables, which predict negative stock returns, also predict 
investment, controlling for investment opportunities and financial slack. 
They show that a typical change in one of their “mispricing proxies” results 
in a roughly a two to four percent change in the firm’s investment as a 
percentage of capital. Their model predicts that these sensitivities should be 
greater, the greater the degree of asymmetric information between firms and 
investors. They also found that investment is more sensitive to mispricing 
for firm with higher R&D intensity (suggesting longer period of information 
asymmetry) or share turnover (suggesting that the firm’s shareholders are 
short-term investors). They documented the same patterns in the cross-
section of average returns. Firms with relatively high (low) investment 
subsequently have relative low (high) stock return, after controlling for 
investment opportunities and other characteristics linked to return 
predictability (Polk and Sapienza, 2002). 
Baker and Wurgler (2003) also examined how investor sentiment affects the 
cross-section of returns. They started from the theory that predicts that a 
broad wave of sentiment will disproportionally affect stocks whose 
valuation is highly subjective and are difficult to arbitrage. They tested this 
prediction by studying how the cross-section of subsequent stock returns 
varies with proxies for beginning-of-period investor sentiment. Specifically, 
when sentiment appears to be high, stocks that are likely to be relatively 
attractive to optimism and speculator and at the same time unattractive 
candidates for arbitrage – young stocks, small stocks, unprofitable stocks, 
non-dividend paying stocks, high-volatility stocks, extreme-growth stocks, 
and distressed stock – experienced low future return relative to other stocks. 
In case of low sentiment these cross-sectional patterns attenuate or reverse.  
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In a paper of 2006 the same authors (Baker and Wurgler) review the 
theoretical and empirical evidence to explain which stocks are likely to be 
most affected by sentiment. They, once again, empirically demonstrated that 
when sentiment is high, subsequent market returns are low. In particular, 
they show that it is quite possible to measure investor sentiment, and that 
waves of sentiment have clearly discernible, important and regular effects 
on individual firms and on the stock market as a whole. In particular, stocks 
that are difficult to arbitrage or to value are most affected by sentiment. 
They proposed the seesaw diagram (below) that summarizes their approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Cross-sectional effects of investor sentiment – Baker and Wurgler, 2006. 
 
Another interesting study related to investor sentiment and corporate 
disclosure has been proposed by Bergam and Roychowghhury (2008). They 
investigated how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their 
disclosure policies in an attempt to influence the sentiment-induced biased 
in expectation. They hypothesize that when investor sentiment is high and 
expectation of future earnings are relatively more optimistic, managers will 
reduce voluntary disclosure and remain silent in the attempt to maintain 
these more optimistic valuations. In contrast, when consumer confidence is 
low and expectations are less optimistic, manager will increase voluntary 
disclosure to the market, attempting to adjust expectations upwards. They 
found that when sentiment is high, analyst earnings estimates, particularly 
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for the long horizon, tend to be more optimistic as compared to actual 
earning realizations. They demonstrated that during period of low 
sentiment, managers increase the frequency of long-horizon earnings 
forecasts which walk-up analyst consensus estimates. Thus, forecasting over 
longer horizons appears to be affected by managers’ desire to maintain 
optimistic valuations. In contrast, over the short horizon, we find that during 
periods of high sentiment, firms increase the frequency of walk-down 
forecast, while during periods of low sentiment they increase the frequency 
of walk-up forecasts (Bergam and Roychowghhury 2008).  
 
 
1.5. Stock market overvaluation and undervaluation 
Previous studies provide evidence that there are a variety of reasons why a 
firm can be overvalued (firm’s value higher than its fundamentals or 
underlying value, Jensen (2005)); yet the causes of overvaluation are 
difficult to pinpoint and identify empirically. Regardless of the exact causes 
of overvaluation, over time the price of overvalued equity will drop towards 
the underlying value. In the case of equity overvaluation, this price drop is 
inevitable because information about the firm’s fundamentals will be 
revealed over time, and investors’ opinion about valuation will converge 
toward the underlying value of the firm. However, a drop in equity price for 
any reason is rarely desirable to any manager who has a lot to gain when 
equity price increases.  Recent empirical researches pointed out that 
managers’ wealth and compensation increase with the stock price through 
stock performance-based incentives (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; 
Burns and Kedia, 2008) and, that manager’s job security increases with the 
stock price. Weisbach (1988) suggests that a manager is less likely to lose 
his job when the stock is performing well. Moreover, a strong stock 
performance increases the manager’s value in the executive labour market.  
While prior finance and accounting research does not identify the exact 
causes of overvaluation, it provides evidence that overvalued firms are 
associated with pattern of high earnings growth expectations (Jensen, 2004); 
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a story of merger and acquisitions (Travols, 1987; Moeller, Schlingeman, 
and Stulz, 2004); and greater analyst dispersions, which can lead to 
mispricing and, in particular, overpricing due to the different opinions of 
firm value (Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens, 2005).  
An interesting stream of research analyses the relationship between equity 
overvaluation and IPOs. The studies demonstrate that it is not uncommon 
that IPOs are systematically overvalued compared with their fundamentals 
(Moller et al., 2003; Shiah-HOU, 1997). Moller et al., (2003) provide 
evidence of the magnitude of the costs of the overvalued equity in the recent 
period. Their research findings showed that in the three-day period 
surrounding the announcement of acquisitions in the period 1998-2001, 
acquiring firms nearly lost a total of $240 billion compared to a total loss of 
$4.2 billion in all of the 1980s. Jensen in a paper published in 2004 in the 
European Financial Management explains the previous overvalued equities 
phenomenon as an agency costs.  
In a following paper, Jensen (2005) provides a more deep explanation of the 
phenomenon pointing out that “equity is overvalued when a firm’s stock 
price is higher then its underlying value”. By definition, an overvalued 
equity means the company will not be able to deliver, except by pure luck, 
the performance to justify its value (Jensen, 2005). Because of their access 
to superior information, managers of the company will probably understand 
this before most others stakeholders and, at this point, they begin to worry 
about whether they can really support this high price. At the same time 
analysts, typically, begin to pressure them to do something to justify this 
high price, and such pressure inevitably begin to push managers to take 
actions that will at least make it appear that they are delivering the 
performance to justify the price. When they do that, they are taking actions 
that actually destroy value in the long run but generate the appearance of 
improved performance in the short run (Jensen, 2004). To prolong the 
overvaluation, a manager can take several actions such as: overinvesting 
through acquisition or expansions, commitment financial frauds, or 
managing earnings.  
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The theoretical framework provides evidence also for the undervaluation 
phenomenon. Eberhart et al. (2004) show that the share of the companies 
with growing R&D (more than 5 percent annual growth in R&D-to-total 
assets) yield positive and significant risk-adjusted stock returns for up to 
five year following the R&D increase. The fact that these companies 
generate abnormal future stock returns – almost 20 percent in the first two 
years – implies that investors undervalued their shares when the R&D 
information was reported, and it took several years for the undervaluation to 
be corrected.   
 
As said the aim of this study is to analyse the relationship between firm’s 
market valuation and earnings management phenomenon. Thus, once 
introduced the shares mispricing topic with the related empirical studies, in 
the following section we introduce the earnings management phenomenon 
and, then we provide a review of the studies that have empirically tested the 
relationship between the agency costs of overvalued equity and earnings 
management. As we will explain in the hypothesis development section, 
once tested the Jensen’s prediction about the shares’ overpricing, the aim of 
this research is also to analyse firm’s behaviour also in case of shares 
underpricing and its association with the earnings management.   
 
 
2. Earnings management 
 
2.1. Earnings management definition 
The traditional view on the value of accounting information is that this has a 
dual role: informativeness and stewardship (Ronen, 1979; Antle and 
Demski, 1989; Natarajan, 1996, 2004; Rajan and Sarath, 1996; Sunder, 
1997, 2002; Christensen and Demski, 2003; Feltham, Indjejikinan, and 
Nanda, 2006). The informativeness role arises from investor’s demand for 
information to predict future cash flow and assesses their risk. A rich stream 
of literature illustrates this informativeness empirically through findings that  
associates earnings and stock prices.  Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2003, 
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for example, found that reported earnings number are more closely 
associated with process than cash flows, sales, and other financial 
statements’ data.  
The stewardship role of accounting comes from the separation between 
ownership and management in public firms, which put their managers in a 
position of a steward to shareholders. Since managers act as self-interested 
individuals, goal congruence between the shareholders and managers is no 
longer assured. For shareholders, the remedy is to demand information to 
monitor the manger after he has acted and to provide him with incentives 
that align his interests with their own (Ronen, 2010). As Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) state: “one function of financial reporting is to 
constrain management to act in the shareholders’ interest”.  
Once briefly introduced the dominant perspective on the role of accounting 
information we provide a literature review on the definitions of earnings 
management phenomenon. The academic literature on earnings 
management is well established and in order to provide a clear framework in 
which this work will be developed, we report the most useful definition of 
earnings management. 
Ronen (2007) summarizes the different definitions of earnings management 
classifying them in three different areas: white, grey and black. Beneficial 
(white) earnings management enhances the transparency of reports and it is 
defined as “earnings management is taking advantage of the flexibility in 
the choice of accounting treatment to signal the manger’s private 
information on the future cash flows”; the pernicious earnings management 
(black) involves outright misrepresentation and fraud and it is defined as 
“earnings management is the practice of using tricks to misrepresent or 
reduce transparency of the financial reports”; and, the grey earnings 
management that is manipulation of reports within the boundaries of 
compliance with bright-line standards and it is defined as “earnings 
management is choosing an accounting treatment that is either 
opportunistic (maximizing the utility of management only) or economically 
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efficient”. This grey one definition will be the framework in which our 
research is developed. 
Following Devidson et al. (1987) managing earnings is “the process of 
taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted 
accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings”.  
Fields, Lys and Vincent, (2001) pointed out that earnings management 
occur when ”managers exercise their discretion over the accounting 
numbers with or without restrictions. Such discretion can be either firm 
value maximizing or opportunistic”. According to Scott (2003), “earnings 
management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies so as to 
achieve specific objective”.  
Ronen (2007) suggests that the definition in the literature that best describes 
earnings management seems to be the one provided by Healy and Whalen in 
1999: “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depends on reported accounting numbers”. In fact, this definition captures 
both the costly-contracting approach (earnings management is used to 
influence contracting outcomes), the informational approach (earnings 
management is used to mislead stakeholders) and it also captures the 
connotation of opportunistic manipulation.  
As we already said, engaging in earnings management is not a risk free-
operation. First of all, companies and CEOs risk damaging their reputations 
and, second, there are also litigation risks involved with managing earnings. 
Therefore, companies will only engage in earnings management when the 
benefits of this behaviour are higher then the risk and costs involved.  
Previous research provides several categories of incentive that try to explain 
the reason of earnings management, such as: stock market incentives, 
signalling/concealing private information, political costs, CEOs 
compensation and reputation, companies internal reason and so on.  
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In order to better explain our theoretical framework, in the next section we 
provide a brief review on the studies that link earnings to the stock market 
prices and earnings management to the stock market incentives.  
 
 
2.2. The relationship between earnings and stock market 
The interaction between accounting numbers and stock markets reaction has 
been widely recognized by the academic environment.  
Earnings provide information to investors. Some information is already 
known before the firm publicizes its results. In this case the announcement 
confirm the market’s (and market maker’s) beliefs. Some other information, 
instead, is a surprise. Once investors revise their beliefs about the firm’s 
value, they adjust their investment decisions, which, in turn, affect the 
market price (Ronen, 2007). The street wisdom is that “better earnings 
equal a higher stock price” (Anderson and Thomas, Picking up the pieces, 
The Fall Refco Is Providing a Test for Wall Street, New York Times, 
October 15, 2005). 
The accounting research supports the street wisdom by providing 
extensively empirical evidence of the positive link between earnings and the 
market price and between the market price and the future earnings. (Lev, 
1989; Ball and Bartov, 1996; La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1997; Choi, Lee, and Press, 2002; Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin, 2002). 
 
 
2.3. The relation between earnings management and stock market 
incentives 
As we already said, there are several possible motives for manipulating 
earnings but the spotlight has been on those incentives that are related to the 
stock market. Although the focus on listed companies seems logical and 
natural, we want to confirm once and again that the majority of the earnings 
management studies published in the journals that are under consideration, 
rely on US and UK data. The US economy is known for its widespread 
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ownership and its liquid and efficient stock markets (Cormier et al., 2000). 
In several other countries, like European countries, there are far less listed 
companies and privately owned companies set the tone. We have to 
consider that in those countries, there might be other important reasons for 
earnings management (such as tax avoidance) that haven’t been under the 
attention of researchers quite as much. In those countries managers and 
CEOs might engage in earnings management for different reasons, through 
different forms, different models and also the relations with stock markets 
could indicate different results (Leuz, Nanda and Wisocki, 2003) 
Based on the previous US researches, meeting or beating the analysts’ 
forecast seems to be of enough importance for companies to engage 
earnings management. Several research papers are dedicated to find out why 
mangers try to meet or beat expectations as well as to finding evidence 
consistent with earnings management to rich this benchmark. Bartov et al. 
(2002) in their study provide evidence that meeting the analysts’ 
expectations is important because firm that meet or beat expectation enjoy 
higher returns, even when it is likely that is achieved through earnings 
management or expectation management. Matsunaga and Park (2001), 
instead, documented that missing an earnings benchmark has negative 
implications for stock return as well as CEO compensation.  
To be able to meet or beat the forecasts, managers turn to earnings 
management. Payne and Robb (2000) concluded that the more analysts 
agree, the stronger the incentive is to meet the consensus forecast. If pre-
managed earnings are below the forecast, managers use income-increasing 
earnings management. If pre-managed earnings are higher then the forecast, 
manager can choose between income-decreasing earnings management 
(saving it for a bad day) or not managing the earnings, hoping for an 
increase in stock return.  
In order to identify firms that might engage in earnings management to 
avoid negative earnings surprise, Matsumoto (2002) has tried to identify 
firm characteristics that are associated with this kind of behaviour. She 
found that firms with higher transient institutional ownership are more 
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likely to meet or beat expectations.  These firms seems to use earnings 
management as well as expectations management to be able to meet the 
expectations.  
To align shareholders’ goal with managers’ objectives and give less room to 
agency conflicts, CEO’s and senior manager are typically compensated by 
equity incentives. The previously mentioned papers introduce evidence of 
earnings management to meet or beat expectations and to influence stock 
price. This kind of opportunistic behaviour might even increase when there 
is a direct link of these two incentives and the financial benefit of the firm’s 
management. Benish and Vargus (2002), Park and Park (2004) Cheng and 
Warfiel (2005) documented earnings management’s link with insider 
trading. With reference to this field, other studies documented the 
relationship between earnings management and stock compensation through 
stock options. For a deeply explanations see: Baker et al (2003), Bartov and 
Mohanram (2004), Kwon and Yin (2006). 
As we can see from the previous review, there are lots of studies that have 
empirically demonstrated the link between earnings, earnings management, 
and stock market incentives. In section 3.1, instead, we report only the 
studies that empirically validated the Jensen’s hypothesis on the link 
between agency costs of overvalued equity and earnings management. 
Before that, we provide a review of the theoretical model used by scholars 
to detect earnings management. We think this review should be useful for 
both the theoretical and the empirical section explanation.  
 
 
2.4 Detecting Earnings Management 
In this section we will describe the earnings management proxy typically 
used in the empirical analysis. Since earnings management is an inherently 
unobservable process, proxies are needed to make inferences.  
Most of the researches have identified earnings management with the 
detection of discretionary accruals.  
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Accrual accounting is based on the notion that there is a difference between 
costs and expenditures versus benefits and revenues. In fact, accruals arise 
when there is a discrepancy between the timing of cash flow and the timing 
of accounting recognition of the transaction (Ronen, 2007). Due to this fact 
net income can be seen as the adjustment of the operational cash flow for 
transitory components resulting in net income from operation. These 
adjustment items are called accruals. Earnings management literature, 
typically, refers to the intentional manipulation of accruals in order to 
maximize the managers’ utility and/or the market value of the firm. 
 
In this section we chronologically provide a review about the seminal 
papers that have provided theoretical and empirical contributions to 
earnings management literature.  
 
The first contribution to the earnings management literature in order to 
model normal accruals was done by Ronen and Sadan in 1981. They 
estimate the long-run earnings. Since firm must report, in total the true 
earnings, smoothing involves the timing of the recognition of the income-
statement items. They estimated the trend of operating income through a 
two-stage procedure that involves the deviation of reported income from the 
long-run trend–abnormal income, also referred to as abnormal operating 
income. In their model, if the deviation of reported income from the long-
run (they called S) is positive, the firm is likely to manage income 
downward, and vice versa.  
 
Healy (1985) was the first to consider earnings management using what he 
termed “discretionary accruals”. These are the accruals that are under the 
discretion of management and they are considered as a proxy for earnings 
management behaviour. In his paper, he tests the bonus-maximizing 
hypothesis of managerial behaviour. Healy analyses the incentives of 
management to manage earnings downward when its managerial bonus is 
“out of the money”. By using actual parameters and definitions of bonus 
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contracts in 94 sample firms, he find that accrual policies of managers are 
linked to the income reporting incentives of their bonus contracts, and that 
changes in accounting procedures by managers are linked to adoption or 
modification of their bonus plan. He proposes “discretionary” accruals as a 
proxy for earnings management behaviour. Healy defines DA (discretionary 
accruals) as follows: 
     
   DA = −DEP − X2D1 +ΔWORK − (TP +D1)×D2  
 
where: 
DA  discretionary accruals, which are equated with total 
accruals (denoted by ACC); 
DEP   depreciation;  
X2   extraordinary items; 
D1  dummy variable; D1=1 if bonus plan earnings are defined 
after (before) extraordinary items; 
 
ΔWORK  the change in select accruals from working capital: the 
increase in accounting receivable plus the increase in 
inventory plus the decrease in accounts payable; 
ΔTP   the change in income tax payable; 
D2  dummy variable; D2=1 (0) if bonus plan earnings are 
defined after (before) income tax. 
 
The problem related to this model is that components of accruals 
(discretionary and non-discretionary) are not observable so researcher has to 
make assumption about one of the components. Healy assumes that the 
discretionary accruals component is the level of accruals in a given year and 
he assumes that non-discretionary accruals are zero in expectation. 
 
De Angelo (1986) conducts a study of 64 companies whose managers 
propose to go private by purchasing all of the publicly held common stock. 
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She uses discretionary accruals to test whether these managers 
systematically understate earnings in the period before the buyout. She uses 
as a proxy for discretionary accruals the change in total accruals. In the first 
(1986) study, DeAngelo does not detect earnings management, but in the 
1988 study she is more successful. Her test results indicate that earnings 
increase during a contest by 1% of total assets, but accruals increase by 
about 2%, although the change in cash flow is close to zero. Hence, the 
evidence is more consistent with earnings management rather than 
improved performance in response to the pressure of the contest.  
 
McNichols et al. (1988) examine whether manager manipulate earnings by 
focusing on a specific accruals, the provision for bad debt. They use 
Generally Accepted Accounting principle (GAAP) to formulate a model of 
the expected accrual in the absence of earnings management. The results 
show that the discretionary component of the provision for bad debt is 
income-decreasing for firms whose earnings are usually high or low. Even 
though their methodology is more powerful in detecting earnings 
management than the previous methodology using total accruals, the total 
accrual approach is typically preferred because is comprehensiveness. 
 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) analyse the spending on research and 
development (R&D) during the last year of the tenure of an outgoing CEO. 
They formulate the following hypothesis: a reduction in expenditures on 
R&D activities is H1: more likely during the years immediately before a 
CEO departure; H2: less likely if the CEO’s wealth is sensitive to the firm 
value, and H3: less likely if the turnover is peaceful. The first hypothesis 
arises from the fact that net income is a basis for the CEO’s bonus. Hence, 
CEOs have incentives to increase earnings by reducing the R&D 
expenditure. The second hypothesis is based on the observation that a 
reduction in R&D reduce the firm’s expected value, so the CEO’s incentive 
to reduce R&D are weakened when he holds share of the firm. The third is 
based on the fact that when a departing CEO passes his authority to his 
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designated successor a few years before his retirement, by the time the CEO 
quits the post, he has no authority over these decisions (Vancil, 1987). 
Dechow and Sloan based their research design on the assumption that the 
variation in the determinants of non-discretionary accruals is common 
across all firms in the same industry. This industry model for normal non-
discretionary accruals is: 
    
    NDAt+1 = γ1 +γ2median(TAt+1)  
 
where, the median (TAt+1)  is the median value of the total accruals, scaled 
by lagged assets for all non-sample firms in the same industry and year 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995, use the two-digit SIC code).  
The advantage of this approach is that the researcher does not have to 
formulate a model of how the normal item under investigation (in this case, 
R&D) behaves. The test considers, instead, the difference in TA between a 
firm with incentive to manage earnings and its colleagues that lack these 
incentives (Ronen, 2007). 
However, there are a couple of disadvantages: first, the model applies only 
to event study in which not all firms experience the same event. Second, 
even if not all firms in the industry have the same incentives to manage 
earnings, if other firms in the industry also manage earnings in the same 
direction, the test biases against finding earnings management, and if other 
firms manage earnings in the opposite direction, the test might indicate non-
existent earnings management (Ronen, 2007). 
 
Jones (1991) tests earnings management behaviour during import relief 
investigations by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). She finds 
that discretionary accruals are more income-decreasing during the year the 
ITC completed this investigation than would otherwise be expected. She 
uses a regression-type model to estimate non-discretionary accruals in a 
given year based on the change in economic conditions. Specifically, she 
expects that working capital accruals are related to the change in sales and 
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that depreciation is related to the level of gross property, plant and 
equipment. The model use to estimate non-discretionary accruals is as 
following: 
 
   
TACt
At−1
=α( 1At−1
)+β1(
ΔSt
At−1
)+β2 (
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At−1
)+εt
   
 
where:  
TACt   total operating accruals in year t, 
At−1    total asset at the beginning of the year t, 
ΔSt   change in sales from year t-1 to year t, and 
PPEt   gross property, plant and equipment. 
 
In the previous model all variables are divided by the beginning level of 
total assets to adjust for heteroskedasticity. 
The discretionary accrual component is estimated as the difference between 
total accruals and the non-discretionary component using the coefficient 
from the previous regression: 
 
   
DACt =
TACt
At−1
− (a* 1At−1
− b* ΔStAt−1
− b2
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where a , b1 , b2 are the coefficient estimated in the previous regression and 
all the other variables are as previous defined.  
 
Dechow et al. (1995) test several models estimating discretionary accruals 
including those discussed above in terms of their power (type II error) and 
specification (type I error)2. They introduced the modified Jones model in 
which the change in receivables is deducted from the change in sales in the 
                                                
2 When omitted variable are correlated with PART or the liner model is misspecified, DA are measure 
with one of the two errors: 
Type I error: an erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis that firm do not manage earnings. 
Type II error: an erroneous acceptance of the null hypothesis that firm do not manage earnings. 
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estimation model (1.1) to eliminate the conjectured tendency of the Jones 
model to measure discretionary accruals with error when discretion is 
exercise over revenues. So, the novelty of the modified Jones model is the 
treatment of accounts receivable.  If the firm does not manage earnings in 
the estimation period, the accruals of credit sales are normal in the 
estimation period and abnormal in the event period. The modified Jones 
model recognizes this difference in time-series analysis by making the 
following adjustment: the first stage of estimating normal accruals is similar 
to the Jones model; the second stage (the event period), normal accruals, 
NDA, are computed by multiplying the estimated coefficient of the change 
in sales by the change in cash sales (the change in revenues minus the 
change in account receivable) instead of the change in sales. The NDA of 
firm i in the event period p are computed as follows: 
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where: 
NDAip   normal, non-discretionary accruals of firm I in period p; 
Aip−1   lagged asset of firm i; 
REV    revenues; 
AR   account receivable; 
PPE   property, plant & equipments; 
Δ   change; 
βˆ1i  the coefficient of total revenues in the estimation period. It 
is estimated from the regression of accruals on ΔREVi  and 
PPEi  
 
The modified Jones model exhibits the most power in detecting earnings 
management.  
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The forward-looking model is given in Dechow, Richardson and Tuna 
(2003). This model includes three innovations: a separation of NDA (non-
discretionary accruals) from the DA (discretionary accruals) in the credit 
sales, a control for lagged accruals, and a control for growth.  
The first innovation treats some credit sales as non-discretionary in the 
event period as well. Dechow et al. (2003) regress the change in account 
receivable, ΔREC  on the change in sales ΔSales (both variables are 
deflated by lagged assets): 
    ΔREC = a+ kΔSales+ε  
where: 
ΔREC   the change in account receivable; 
ΔSales   the change in sales; 
k   the coefficient of the change in sales. 
 
The parameter, k, measure the sensitivity of the change in non-discretionary 
account receivable to sales.  
The second innovation is the addition of lagged accruals. Dechow at. Al 
(2003) reported that this innovation increase the adjusted R2  to 17.2%.  
The third innovation reflects the fact that some abnormal accruals arise from 
changes in business decision (Healy, 1996). If sales are expected to grow, 
inventory has to be built up to supply the forthcoming additional demand. 
This, in turn, increases current NDA. A failure to recognize the demand for 
higher level of inventory would lead to erroneously classifying NDA as DA. 
Hence, Dechow et al. (2003) control for growth in sales.  
 
Previous literature has recognized that accruals are related to performance 
(McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; 
Kaszinik, 1999). Performance affects the estimation of earnings 
management because NDA may be erroneously classified as DA when 
performance is abnormal and the relationship between accruals and 
performance is non-linear. In the following section we briefly detail the 
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improvement to the Jones model that deal with the effect of performance on 
DA.  
 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) put forward a model to detect earnings 
management using the balance of accruals rather then the more common 
change in accounts used in other paper. This study does not refine the Jones 
model and it contributes to the literature by pointing at neglected elements 
of the Jones model. They discuss accruals related to sales (account 
receivable), accruals related to expenses (inventories, other current assets, 
and other current liabilities), and accrual related to property, plant end 
equipment (depreciation). Their model relies on the instrumental variable 
approach and provides stronger results. The review, thus, far has allude to 
the fact that, the models used to estimate discretionary accruals for the 
purpose of testing for earnings management suffer from the existence of 
measurement error. This measurement error arises, as said before, because 
variables that explain non-discretionary accruals have been omitted from the 
expectation models and so wind up on the residual term, which represent 
discretionary accruals.  
 
Given that the financial analysis literature advocates detecting earnings 
management by comparing the patterns of accruals and cash flows (e.g. 
Pelepu, Healy, and Bernard, 2003), cash flow seem a natural candidate for a 
performance control. (e.g. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; Rees, Gill 
and Gore, 1996; Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999; Zarowin, 2002; Park and 
Park, 2004; Coehn, Dey and Lys, 2005; Francis, LaFond , Olsson and 
Schipper, 2005; Myers, Myers and Skinner, 2006; Ye, 2006). 
Since cash flows are defined as the difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and accruals, including contemporaneous cash flows as 
a regressor may induce a simultaneously problem, especially if the research 
design uses the statement of cash-flows approach to calculate accruals. 
Thus, until Dechow and Dichev (2002), most studies did not control for this 
performance measure. 
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Dichow and Dichev (2002), focus on the quality of earnings. They make the 
argument that the quality of accruals depends on their mistake in predicting 
cash-flows, since accruals separate the timing of cash flow from their 
accounting recognition. They run the following firm-level, time series 
regression: 
    ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFt−1 + b2CFt + b3CFt+1 +εt  
where: 
ΔWCt   the change in working capital, measured as the sum of the 
change in account receivable + change in inventory minus 
the change in account payable minus the change in tax 
payable plus the change in other net assets net of liabilities, 
with all variable scaled by average assets; 
CFt  cash flow from operations; 
ε  the error term that is used to measure the quality of 
earnings. 
 
The residuals from this regression are used as the measure of the quality of 
earnings and accruals. Examining how a firm’s characteristics affect the 
quality of earnings, they obtain three key findings: the quality of accruals 
decrease in total accruals, firm size, and the volatility of sales, cash flow and 
accruals; these results are explained by the increased chance of being wrong 
when accruals are high. The quality of accruals is decreasing in the length of 
the operating cycle, which is 360/(sales/average account receivable) + 
360/(cost of good sold/average inventory). The intuition of this result is 
immediate to the extent that the quality of accruals is influenced by 
uncertainty: the longer the cycle, the greater the likelihood of making 
mistakes in the estimation and recognition of accruals. The greater the 
frequency with which the firm reports losses, the lower the quality of its 
accruals, since the error in accruals is correlated with stocks.  
 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), developed a performance-matching 
model. Their motivation is to address the non-linear relationship between 
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normal accruals and performance. They offer two different approaches. 
The first involves matching similar firms, which alleviates the need to use 
an OLS estimate of DA. They detect earnings management by comparing 
the accruals of firms that are otherwise almost identical. The second, the 
linear-performance matching model, embodies two modification of the 
Jones and the modified Jones models: and intercept, and an additional 
control for the lagged rate of return on assets, ROAt−1 . They run the 
following regression:   
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where α0 is a constant and  δROAi,p−1  is the lagged rate of return on assets. 
Kothari et al. (2005) found that having an ROA in the regression reduces 
discretionary accruals when they expect the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management to hold. They observed that the standard error of the DAs 
increases with the lagged ROA. 
 
 
3. The agency theory of overvalued equity and earnings management 
An extremely interesting research field came out after the Jensen’s paper 
2005. As we already know, he wrote the first paper about agency costs with 
Meckling in 1976, where agency costs were defined as the costs associated 
with cooperative effort by human beings. They focused on the agency costs 
arising when one entity, the principal, hires another, the agent, to act for him 
or her. They define agency costs, in the original paper, as the sum of the 
contracting, monitoring and bounding costs undertaken to reduce costs due 
to the conflict of interest, plus the “residual loss” that occurs because it is 
generally impossible to perfectly identify the agents’ interest with that of the 
principal. In that article they viewed markets as potent forces to help 
controlling agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
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In a paper published in 2005 Jensen pointed out how securities markets can, 
sometimes, create and exacerbate conflict of interest between managers and 
owners rather then solve them. He pointed out that this paper can be 
understood as expanding the range of costly conflict of interest that the 
Agency Model can handle, in particular market and managerial optimism 
and the forces that allow or even encourage markets to become enablers of 
value-destroying managerial behaviour.  
The main focus of the Jensen’s paper is that “people are paid not for what 
they do, but for what they do relative some target”. This perspective leads 
people to game the system by manipulating both the setting of the target and 
how they meet their targets. These counterproductive target-based budget 
and compensation systems provide the fertile foundation for the damaging 
effects of the earnings management game with the capital markets (Jensen, 
2005). CEOs and CFOs know that the capital markets will punish the entire 
firm if they miss analysts’ forecasts. As managers who meet or exceed their 
internal targets receive a bonus, the capital markets reward a firm with a 
premium for meeting or beating analysts’ expectations.  
Before Jensen’s paper (2005), Skinner and Sloan (2002) demonstrated that 
when a firm produces earnings that beat the consensus of the analyst 
forecast for the quarter, the stock price raise on average by 5,5 percent more 
during the quarter than the returns on a size-matched portfolio. For negative 
earnings surprises the stock price falls on average by – 5,04 percent more 
during the quarter then the size-matched portfolio.  Generally, the only way 
for manager to meet those expectations, year and year out, is cook their 
numbers to mask the inherent uncertainty in their business. When number 
are manipulated to tell the markets what they want to hear rather then the 
true status of the firm and, when the real operating decisions that would 
maximize value are compromised to meet market expectations, real long-
term value is being destroyed (Jensen, 2005). Jensen theoretically pointed 
out that overvalued equity creates a setting in which some managers (agent) 
take actions to support the firm’s short-term stock price, and those actions 
are costly to the current debt-holders and long-term stockholders (principal). 
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Under the agency theory of overvalued equity, managers of overvalued 
firms are likely to manage their firms’ earnings to enhance the 
overvaluation.  
Since 2005, several empirical studies have been done in order to 
demonstrate the validity of the Jensen’s prediction. In the following section 
we provide a review of the researches analysing the relation between shares 
misevaluation and earnings management.  
 
 
3.1 Empirical evidences supporting the Jensen’s agency cost of 
overvalued equity and earnings management 
The Jensen’s predictions on the agency cost of the overvalued equity has 
opened a wide field of research that demonstrated the validity of his 
predictions, in particular focusing on the relation between overvalued 
companies and earnings management.  
Kothari et al. (2006) provide empirical evidences that support the Jensen’s 
argument. Their study is based on the assumption that agency theory of 
overvalued equity predicts that the overvalued firms are likely to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management in order to meet the unrealistic 
performance expectations incorporated in the stock prices. They expected 
that a sub-sample of firms with upward managed accruals will be more 
heavily populated with overvalued firms and the subsequent negative stock 
performance of such companies is a mere overvaluation reversal. Using a 
sample of US companies with data starting from 1963 to 2004, they 
formulate a number of testable predictions that allow them to distinguish 
between the agency theory of overvalued equity and the traditional investor 
fixation hypothesis as the driving force behind the accrual anomaly. 
Consistent with the agency theory of overvalued equity, they found an 
asymmetry in the relation between accruals and returns, accruals and 
insider-trading patterns, and accruals and corporate investment financing 
decisions. They found that companies in the highest income-increasing 
accrual decile experience an economically large abnormal price run-up prior 
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to the accrual management year, which is followed by stock 
underperformance in the subsequent years.  
Chi and Gupta (2007) contributed to the same stream of literature 
empirically examining the significance of the agency costs of overvalued 
equity by focusing on earnings management. Their study is organised 
around the research question whether equity overvaluation leads to more 
income-increasing earnings management. Taking into consideration a 
sample of U.S. firm year observations from 1964 to 2003, earnings 
management measurement based on a modified version of the Jones (1991) 
model and, a measure of overvaluation as suggested by Rhodes-Kropf et al 
(RKRV, 2005), they found that overvaluation is significantly related to 
subsequent income-increasing earnings management (i.e. high discretionary 
accruals). The effect is large economically: a one-standard deviation 
increases in total valuation error a fifteen-per cent standard deviation 
increases in discretionary accruals. Consistent with the accruals anomaly 
literature, they found that higher discretionary accruals are associated with 
lower future abnormal stock return. Moreover, they demonstrated that this 
association becomes stronger as prior overvaluation intensifies. In fact, 
among the most overvalued firms, those with the higher discretionary 
accruals underperform those with the low discretionary accruals during the 
following year by 11,88% after adjusting for the Fama-French (1993) risk 
factors. They also found that higher discretionary accruals are associated 
with lower future operating performance, and also this association becomes 
stronger as prior overvaluation intensifies. Among the most overvalued-
firms, those with high discretionary accruals underperform those with low 
discretionary accruals during the following year by 12,87% as measured by 
industry-adjusted unmanaged EBITDA-to-asset ratio.  
The relation found by Chi and Gupta (2007) on the association between 
discretionary and lower future abnormal stock returns as well as between 
accruals and lower future operating performance, are robust once 
controlling for a host of firm attributes, governance and managerial 
incentive attributes. 
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As far as the theoretical contribution is concerned, previous results should 
be considered as a complement of Efendi et al.’s (2007). Efendi et al. 
provide evidence that CEO holdings in-the-money stock options engage 
significantly more in financial restatements. In particular, they investigated 
the incentives that led the rush of restated financial statements at the end of 
the 1990s market bubble, providing evidence on CEO opportunism during 
the 1990s in an effort to support overvalued stock price. Using a sample of 
350 US companies that announced restatements between January 1, 2001 
and June 30, 2002, they found that the likelihood of a misstated financial 
statement increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings in – 
the-money stock options. They found also that misstatement are also more 
likely for firms that are constrained by the interest-coverage debt covenant, 
that raise new debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as a 
board chair. In summary, their results, based on a US sample, indicate that 
agency costs increased as substantially overvalued equity caused managers 
to take actions to support the stock price.  
Always related to the agency theory of overvalued equity and earnings 
management issue, Bardertscher (2010) examines how the degree and 
duration of overvaluation affect management’s choice of alternative 
earnings management mechanisms. Specifically, he examines the relation 
between overvalued equity and management’s use of alternative within-
GAAP earnings management mechanisms and subsequent non-GAAP 
earnings management. He started from the Jensen’s prediction that manager 
are likely to engage in several types of earnings management practices in 
order to meet unrealistic performance expectations incorporate in the 
overvalued stock price. Badertscher (2010) termed these alternative earnings 
management choices Real Transaction Management (RTM), within-GAAP 
Accruals Management (AM), and non-GAAP earnings management. RTM 
refers to the purposeful altering of reported earnings in a particular direction 
by changing the timing or structuring of an operating, investing, or 
financing decision. Accruals management refers to the purposeful altering 
of accruals in a particular direction, either within-GAAP (i.e., AM) or 
 
 
 44 
outside the boundaries of the GAAP (i.e., Non GAAP), achieved when 
managers adjust revenue or expense accrual to alter financial reports. In 
order to estimate overvalued equity, he employed the residual income model 
of Edwards and Bell (1961) and Ohlson (1961). Specifically, he predicts 
that the longer a firm is overvalued the more likely the firm will engage in 
within-GAAP earnings management. If at some point the overvalued firm is 
no longer able to engage in within-GAAP earnings management, he predicts 
that they will likely segue to non-GAAP earnings management in order to 
report the high performance demanded by the market year after year. Using 
a sample of US firms from 1994 to 2008, he pointed out that the longer a 
firm is overvalued the greater the amount of total within-GAAP earnings 
management exhibited by the firm. More interestingly, he found that 
overvalued firms initially engage in AM but at some point run out of AM 
choices and resort to the RTM.  In other words, the results suggest that to 
sustain overvaluation, firm transaction from one type of earnings 
management to another rather than using only one type. He also found 
evidence that firms with sustained overvaluation are more likely to be 
restricted in their ability to engage in further AM, leading them to engage in 
more drastic and costly form of RTM.  
Once within-GAAP earnings management options have been exhausted, his 
findings indicate that some firms resort to the most egregious form of 
earnings management, non-GAAP earnings management.  
In summary, this study investigates how the degree and duration of firm 
overvaluation affect management’s choice of alternative earnings 
management mechanism and, it sheds light on how one type of earnings 
management segues into another in order to sustain overvaluation, showing 
that the longer a firm is overvalued, the more likely the firm is to engage in 
a non-GAAP earnings management. 
Marciukaityte and Varma (2007) estimate that firms that made earnings-
decreasing restatements over the period 1990 to 2001 lost $72 billion 
around restatement announcements. Moreover, they found that forty-seven 
large-loss firms restating their earnings in the 1998 to 2001 period account 
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from $66 billion of these losses. They empirically demonstrated that despite 
very good stock performance and low book-to-market values before 
earnings misstatement, large-loss firms are associated with mean abnormal 
returns of -39% during the announcement period, and underperform 
matched firms by 44% during the first post-restatement year. Using a 
sample of 526 US companies that restated their earnings over the period 
1990 to 2001, they empirically validated the role of agency costs of 
overvalued equity in earnings manipulation. The authors explained that their 
decision to use earnings restatements to validate the agency costs of 
overvalued equity hypothesis proposed by Jensen, is due to the assumption 
that restatements provide a more suitable sample to test the relationship with 
earnings management. Marciukaityte and Varma (2007) deem, and is a 
widespread belief also in the academic debate, that earnings restatement is 
the best way to measure earnings management because, by definition, is an 
admission by management that earnings were improperly reported.  
A more recent paper by Houmes and Skantz (2010), using a sample that 
include all the firms in Compustat annual database from 1990 to 2005, 
provides evidence consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis. Their 
evidence suggests that high firm valuation and CEO equity at risk increase 
the likelihood of earnings management, and that the two incentives may 
complement one another. One implication for directors and audit 
committees that come from the Houmes et al. is that they should be 
particularly conscious of potential earnings manipulation when their firms 
has extremely high valuation multiples and when the CEO has a lot of 
equity at risk (Houmes and Skantz, 2010).  
The previous section has provided a review of the researches that 
empirically demonstrated the relationship between shares mispricing and 
earnings management (measured using several proxies), validating the 
agency costs of overvalued equity proposed by Jensen in 2005. As we 
already said, one weakness of the researches presented in this section is that 
they are all developed using US companies, not providing evidence from 
other institutional contests. Our aim is to provide evidence that validate the 
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Jensen’s hypothesis in other institutional contests, in particular, in insider 
system economy. 
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III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
As we said in the literature review, there is a wide field of empirical studies 
that figure out the relationship between overvalued equity and earnings 
management. Lakonishock et al. (1994) find that high market-to-book ratio, 
“glamour stocks”, produces lower raw and size-adjusted returns than lower 
market-to-book firms. Anderson and Brooks (2006) show that P/E anomaly 
may be understated. They found a typical 6% differences in year-ahead 
returns between value and glamour firms based on the most recent P/E and, 
then, they show that the return differences double when using the prior eight 
year average of earnings and price to estimate P/E (price-to earnings ratio). 
Previous studies, based on the US samples, provide evidence that firms with 
high abnormal returns underperform in the future periods. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1984) show that firms with prior three and five years high abnormal 
returns produce negative abnormal returns during the subsequent three and 
five years periods.  
There are several evidence that, ex post, certain highly valued firms 
subsequently underperform the market does not suggest that managers 
accept the decline in share price as inevitable. To the contrary, managers of 
highly valued firms have considerable incentive to avoid reporting 
disappointment earnings and perpetuate the valuations, engaging in earnings 
management.  
In order to validate the Jensen’s predictions of the agency cost of 
overvalued equity and managers’ incentive to perpetuate overvaluation 
engaging in earnings management, we examine the relationship between 
total accruals (used as proxy for earnings management) and market-to-book 
(used as proxy for firm’s market valuation) using the change in total 
accruals from year t-1 to year t and the change in firm’s market valuation 
from year t-1 to year t. The reasons behind this choice will be explained in 
section V.  
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To be more precise, accruals are measured relative to firms industry and 
represent the change in net operating assets that would be absent without 
discretionary earnings management. Thus, a firm with positive total accruals 
in t-1 and a positive change in total accruals in year t is increasing 
discretionary earnings by an increasing amount (income-increasing earnings 
management). Firm with negative total accruals in t-1 and negative change 
in total accruals in year t is decreasing discretionary earnings by decreasing 
amount (income-decreasing earnings management) (Houmes and Skantz, 
20101).  
Based on the previous theoretical framework (reported in section II), in 
order to test the managers’ incentives to perpetuate overvaluation engaging 
in earnings management we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: ceteris paribus, an increasing in firm’s market 
valuation is positively correlated to an increasing in total 
accruals.   
 
As said, to prolong the overvaluation, a manager can resort to overinvesting 
through acquisition or expansions, commitment frauds or managing 
earnings. Once tested the relation between the firm’s market valuation and 
the use of total accruals (as proxy for earnings management), we go more in 
depth empirically analysing the direction of the accounting manipulation. 
Based on the previous theoretical framework, we expect that an increasing 
in firm’s market valuation (overvaluation) induces managers to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management. That phenomenon, based on the 
empirical evidences obtained from the US contest, can be clearly attributed 
to the agency conflicts outlined by Jensen in 2005. 
In fact, when a listed company is overvalued, according to the agency costs 
of overvalued equity presented by Jensen (2005), managers may have two 
choices: one is to report the profit lower than expected based on actual 
performance and the other is to overstate the profit of the company to 
temporarily satisfy market expectation. The research based on data of 42 
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years from 1963 to 2004 of listed companies in the USA conducted by 
Kothari et al. (2006) has shown that the accrual accounting and 
discretionary accruals in the next year of overvalued listed companies are 
higher than those undervalued listed companies. Moreover, Chi and Gupta 
(2007) provide evidence that overvaluation is significantly related to 
subsequent income-increasing earnings management. The effect is very 
strong: one-standard deviation increases in total valuation error a fifteen-per 
cent increase in discretionary accruals.  
So, in order to analyse the manager’s incentive to perpetuate the increasing 
in firm’s market valuation, we expect that it will be a positive association 
between increasing in firm’s market valuation and income-increasing 
earnings management (measured by the positive change from year t-1 to 
year t in total accruals). We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2a: ceteris paribus, income-increasing earnings 
management is positively correlated to an increasing in 
firm’s market valuation. 
 
The previous hypothesis is also coherent with the findings of Badertscher 
(2010). As said before, he predicts that the longer a firm is overvalued the 
more likely the firm will engage in within-GAAP earnings management. If 
at some point the overvalued firms is no longer able to engage in within-
GAAP earnings management, he predicts that managers will likely segue to 
non-GAAP earnings management in order to report the high performance 
demanded by the market year after year and, thus, perpetuating this “game” 
year after year they engage in accounting frauds (cases not considered in our 
research). Moreover, he found that overvalued firms initially engage in 
within-GAAP accruals management but a some point run out of accruals 
management choices and resort to the real transaction. In other words, he 
found evidence that firms with sustained overvaluation are more likely to be 
restricted in their ability to engage in further accruals management, leading 
them to engage in more costly form of real transaction. 
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Based on the Badertscher (2010) findings on the alternative earnings 
management mechanism, we also think that managers of overvalued 
companies might change accounting manipulation from income-increasing 
to income-decreasing earnings management in order to avoid extreme forms 
of upward earnings management. 
Our intuition is that in case of decreasing in firm’s market valuation 
manager’s of previous years overvalued (increasing in firm’s market 
valuation) companies may engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management in order to correct previous upward accrual accounting 
manipulation, avoiding to engage in the extreme forms of earnings 
management (non-GAAP earnings management) that induce accounting 
frauds. 
Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:   
 
H2b: ceteris paribus, income-decreasing earnings 
management is positively correlated to a decreasing in 
firm’s market valuation.  
 
As we will see later in the results section, we examine the robustness of our 
predictions through several sensitivities’ analysis. In particular, we test the 
previous hypotheses also considering the change in discretionary accruals 
(as proxy for earnings management) rather than the changes in total 
accruals. As we will explain later, this test allow us to clean our results from 
the potential effect of the sales growth that might has impact on the level of 
total accruals without any relation with the manager’s discretional accruals 
accounting choices.   
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IV. THE ITALIAN INSIDER SYSTEM 
 
 
1. The Italian institutional contest 
There are several factors that are assumed to determine differences in 
accounting practices across European countries (Joos and Lang, 2004): legal 
environment, capital market, infrastructures and corporate governance 
characteristics. 
The Italian industrial system is mainly characterized by a majority of small 
and medium-sized enterprises, most of them family-owned. As for other 
continental European countries, the main source of financing for the Italian 
business community is represented by bank lending an internal financing. 
Firms tend to establish close relationship with bank and, typically, are 
reluctant to go public. Compare to other large economies in the world, Italy 
has a relatively small equity market (La Porta et al., 1997; Pagano, Panetta, 
Zingales, 1998). The Milan Stock Exchange is the only public equity market 
in Italy3. Typically, firm whose shares are traded on the Milan Stock 
Exchange are former state-controlled entities or family-run firms, both 
characterized by highly concentrated ownership structure.  Corporate 
control is often in the hands of founding families who have superior 
information relative to outside stakeholders. The asymmetric information 
between the insider and the banks are mainly resolved through informal 
channels, therefore there is a limited incentive to produce high quality 
public information. Disclosure, as a result, is seen as a legal/fiscal 
requirements more than useful tool (Zambon and Saccon, 1993) to inform 
outside stakeholders. As a consequence, minority shareholders are in an 
unfavourable position, also because legal enforcement and investor 
protection rules have been rather weak for several years  (Zingales, 1994; 
Fiori, 2003; di Donato, 2005). 
                                                
3 Until 1991, there were other minor stock exchanges in different Italian cities and also other informal 
markets called “mercati ristretti” (Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, 1998). 
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The Italian accounting system is regulated by the Civil Code (Codice Civile) 
that has been consistently revised over time to conform to the European 
Directives. The stated goal of the Italian local GAAP is the preservation of 
equity by accounting-based dividend pay-out rules and a close overlap of 
tax accounting rule with financial accounting rules. 
Besides the Civil Code, the Italian accounting regulation encompasses a set 
of accounting standards (mainly aimed at interpreting and integrating the 
Civil Code) issued by the former Italian accounting body (Consiglio 
Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti e dei Ragionieri), that has now been 
substituted by the Organismo Italiano di Contabilità which is in charge of 
issuing accounting standards for entities that do not apply IFRS, and 
cooperating with international standard setting bodies. The Italian 
accounting system allows using international accounting standards if the 
national rules lack of guidance for a specific topic. Although Italy was, in 
theory, among one of the first European countries that allowed, in 1998, the 
use of internationally oriented accounting standards, in practice there has 
been no application of this rule until 2005, because the Ministry of Justice 
has never issued the effective decree, leaving the application of international 
oriented standards unclear for several years. This implies that early adopters 
of IFRS would have had to prepare group financial accounting information 
also according to local Italian GAAP. The resulting costs might explain the 
widespread reluctance of Italian listed companies to voluntary adopt IFRS 
prior to 2005. With the Legislative Decree n. 38/2005, application of IFRS 
become mandatory for listed firms’ group accounts as of 2005. 
In Italy, the enforcement of financial accounting is performed by the stock 
exchange regulator CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la 
Borsa). Concerning accounting rules enforcement, the CONSOB is entitles 
to monitor the release of information to the market by listed companies and 
to check general compliance with reporting standards. 
In Italy, at the beginning of the 90s, the perception of the inefficiencies and 
problems were considered to be related mainly to insufficient investors’ 
protection (see Bianchi et al, 2001; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; 
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Associazione Preite, 1997). Prompted party by a wide debate and by an 
international literature that suggested that in Italy investor protection was 
poor and partly by a large privatization program, between 1990 and 2005 an 
extensive season of reforms has been developed. A new banking law was 
passed (1993), institutional investors’ role increased in financial markets, 
the stock market was privatized, a securities law was enacted (1998), a 
corporate governance code was introduced (and then twice revised), a new 
company law has been enacted (2004); and the “law on savings” (2005) has 
further strengthened shareholders’ protection (see Barucci (2006); Enriques 
and Volpini (2007)). All these changes – which upgrade the Italian 
institutional framework in terms of international standards – have deeply 
affected the governance structure of the Italian companies, at least according 
to a recent stand of literature that argue (and show empirically) that 
“differences in legal investor protection across countries shape the ability 
of insider to expropriate outsiders, and thus determine investor confidence 
in markets and consequently their development” (Djankov, 2005). 
 
 
2. Earnings management in Italy 
As we already said a wide literature framework and empirical evidence on 
earnings management comes from researches using samples of US listed 
companies, few studies are directed toward Europe and a little less are 
developed in Italy. In this section we provide brief review of the researches  
about earnings management in the Italian institutional contest, trying, on 
one hand, to underline the more meaningful results and, on the other hand, 
to show that no one study has been don with reference to firm’s market 
valuation and earnings management.  
A recent paper by Prencipe, Bar-Yosef (2009), using a sample of Italian 
listed companies analysed the relation between board independence and 
earnings management in family controlled firms. According to previous 
studies, their assumption is that board independence limits earnings 
management in typical widely held companies. The purpose of the Prencipe 
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et al. was to shed light on the question of whether board independence 
constraints earnings manipulation when the company is controlled by a 
family. The empirical evidence tent to support the hypothesis that, in 
family-controlled companies, the percentage of independent members of the 
board of directors (a commonly used proxy for board independence) has a 
weaker effect on earnings management than in non-family controlled 
companies. Moreover, they tested that CEO non-duality is also less effective 
in reducing earnings management, in particular when the CEO is a member 
of the controlling family. They conclude that the presence of the family, 
with strong long-term commitment to the company and its influence in the 
appointment of both top executive and board members, tends to lower board 
member substantial independence and to reduce board effectiveness in 
limiting the extent of earnings management. To achieve previous results, the 
authors composed a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Milan 
Stock Exchange and they used Abnormal Working Capital Accruals 
(DeFond and Park, 2001) as a proxy to measure earnings management.  
Always in the corporate governance and accounting research field, Quagli, 
Avallone and Ramassa, 2006, tried to determine the association between the 
granting employee stock option plan and the adoption of earnings 
management practices. In particular, the analysis makes a preliminary 
contribution to asses whether recognition required by IFRS 2 will imply a 
future reduction in the granting stock option as incentive means. The basic 
assumption of the research is that accounting reasons – no recognition for 
the equity-settled share base payments (ESBPs) in profit and loss statement 
by the pre-IAS/IFRS normative scenario - may have been a relevant 
incentive in adopting this form of compensation. If this assumption is true, 
they presumed that the influence of IFRS 2 will be relevant in the future, 
since IFRS eliminates the accounting convenience for this form of 
compensation. To test this assumption they have formulated an hypothesis 
prediction that companies adopting ESBPs are characterized by a positive 
income-increasing earnings management in comparison to companies with 
no ESBPs. Then, they propose a second hypothesis, stating that the firms’ 
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effect of this accounting standard would consist in a reduction of the 
number of listed firms granting new ESBPs in 2004. Results induce to 
refuse this hypothesis. Italian listed companies adopting ESBPs seem not 
characterised by a significant difference in income-increasing earnings 
management in comparison with companies with no ESBPs. Accordingly, 
no significant change occurs with regard to the adoption of ESBPs in 2004 
taking into consideration both the number of companies issue new plan and 
the number of plan issued. In brief, the ESBP recognition in the profit and 
loss account introduced by IFRS 2 does not seem to change the attitude of 
Italian listed companies toward the issue of stock option plans and stock 
grants. To achieve previous results, Quagli et al. (2006) adopted as a proxy 
for earnings management that involves the common methodology to 
estimate unexpected accruals, as provide by Jones model (1991). 
 
Concerning to the Italian audit market, Cameran, Prencipe and Trombetta 
(2007) tested the effect of auditor tenure and audit change on earnings 
quality in a unique mandatory audit firm rotation environment. Using a 
sample of Italian listed companies from 1985 to 2004 they demonstrated the 
relationship between audit quality, measured in term of earnings 
management4, and audit tenure. As a proxy for earnings quality they used 
two types of accruals: Abnormal Working Capital Accruals and Current 
Accruals as suggest by DeFond and Park 2001. Their results show that the 
raw measures of accruals are negatively related to audit tenure. They found 
an inverse relationship between accruals and audit tenure confirmed by 
positive accruals, but not significant for absolute accruals and negative 
accruals. Hence, they provide evidence that, in their sample, income-
increasing earnings management practices are more likely in the initial part 
of an audit-client relationship. They also examined the effect of voluntary 
audit change versus those resulting from mandatory auditor changes. These 
                                                
4 According to the majority of the earnings management studies in he Italian contest, they use DeFond 
and Park model as a proxy for earnings management. The main idea behind the use of accruals as a 
measure of the audit quality is that high-quality audits should mitigate extreme management report 
decision. 
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results suggest that, in mandatory rotation setting, a voluntary change of the 
auditor tends to improve audit quality while a mandatory change tend to 
hamper audit quality. Overall, their findings do not support claims that there 
are beneficial effects of mandatory audit rotation on audit quality, as suggest 
lately by various US institutions.  
Another interesting paper by Markarian et al. (2007) examines the 
relationship between the choice of R&D cost accounting and earnings 
management incentives. They hypothesized that the decision to capitalize 
R&D costs is related to firm’s change in profitability. Their results indicate 
that firm that have a lower return on assets (compared to the average of the 
previous two years) are more likely to capitalize R&D expenditures, while 
firms that have improved performance are more likely to expense, 
consistent with the earnings-smoothing hypothesis. They also hypothesized 
that a firm’s level of debt financing is related to capitalizing decisions. They 
do not find support for this prediction and, they suggest that this result is 
probably due to the fact that financial institutions tend to adjust reported 
earnings by eliminating the effect of any cost capitalization in order to limit 
the risk of misleading manipulation. 
As we can easily understand from the previous literature, several studies 
have been done in order to understand the magnitude and the possible 
causes of earnings management phenomenon in Italy. However, the stream 
of research is not so well establish and several important arguments have 
been completely neglected, such as the relationship between stock market 
value and earnings management.  
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V. SAMPLE, DATA AND VARIABLES’ DESCRIPTION 
 
1. Sample description and data gathering  
The sample for our tests includes all the Italian non-financial listed 
companies on the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE). A sample of 209 
companies was selected covering a period from 1997 to 2010. 
We excluded financial intermediaries, insurance companies and public 
utilities, because of the relevant differences in regulation and corporate 
governance systems and, above all, to avoid problems associated with 
estimating accruals for various types of regulated and financial services 
companies. Thus, all regulated firms and financial institutions are omitted 
from the study. 
Firm’s market valuation, earnings management measures and firm-level 
variables are computed using accounting and financial data provide by 
Datastream Database that offers access to historical financial content. We 
computed a panel data analysis composed by 209 Italian listed companies 
for the 1997 to 2010 period, in which the sample size changes based on the 
hypothesis that we want to test. All the regression models used in this study 
are controlled for the industry-year effect.  
Attachment 1 provides the list of the companies that compose our sample 
divided by industry. Datastream classifies each company by industry, and a 
sector is any group of stocks with the same industrial classification.  
Table 1 provides only sample size by industry. 
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2. Variables’ description 
In the following section we provide a description of all the variables used in 
our regression analysis, including the variables used for the robustness 
checks.  
 
2.1. Dependent variable: Change in Current Accruals and Change in 
Discretionary Accruals.  
A fundamental element of any test for earnings management is a measure of 
management’s discretion over earnings. Earning management is an activity 
found in almost any major corporations, through which a manager may 
increase or decrease the level of accounting accruals (such as account 
receivable, inventory, account payable, deferred revenue, accrued liabilities 
and pre-paid expenses) in order to reach the desired profit.  
The literature in the earnings management field has followed several 
approaches (modelling specific accruals, examine the statistical properties 
of earnings to identify behaviour that influence earnings, etc…etc) but the 
largest one is the attempt to identify discretionary accruals based on the 
relation between total accruals and hypothesized explanatory factors. This 
Table&1&(&&Sample&size&by&industry
Industry)classification Number)of)companies
Automobile&Parts 11
Chemical 3
Construction&Material 17
Electricity 9
Electronic&Electrical)Equip. 12
Food 10
Gas,)Water)&)Multiutilities 9
General)Industrial 4
General)Retail 5
Healthcare)Equip. 5
Household)Good 11
Industrial)Engeneering 13
Industrial)Transportation 11
Leisure)Good 4
Media 18
Mobile)Telecomunication 2
Oil&Gas)Produces 5
Personal)Good 16
Pharma&Bio 2
Real)Estate)Inv. 9
Softwar&Computer)Services 10
Support)Services 7
Technology)&Hardware 8
Unclassified 8
Total 209
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literature began with Haley (1985) and De Angelo (1986), that, as explained 
in the detecting earnings management section 2.4, used total accruals and 
change in total accruals, respectively, as measure of management’s 
discretion over earnings. 
Thus, following the literature and the previous empirical studies we run our 
analysis considering total accruals as dependent variable.  
In order to estimate the level of total accruals we compute the following 
formula: 
 
    TAijt = (NIijt −CFOijt ) / Assetsijt  
where: 
TAijt   represents the total accruals for firm i at year t: 
NIijt   represents net income for firm i at year t. In particular, it represents 
income before extraordinary items and preferred and common 
dividends, but after operating and non-operating income and 
expense, reserves, income taxes, minority interests and equity in 
earnings (Datastream Datatype WC01551). 
CFOijt  represents the cash flow from operating activities for firm i year t. 
In particular, it represents the net cash receipts and disbursements 
resulting from the operation of the company (Datastream Datatype 
WC04860). 
Assetsijt   represents total assets for firm i at year t. In particular, it represents 
the sum of current total assets, long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant 
and equipment and other assets ( Datastream Datatype WC02999). 
j  represents the industry. 
 
In particular, we examine all hypotheses using change in total accruals. The 
change measure (total accrual in year t minus total accrual in year t-1) is a 
particularly strong test of our hypotheses. To be more precise, accruals are 
measured relative to a firm’s industry and represent the change in net 
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operating assets that would be absent without discretionary earnings 
management. Thus, from an income statement point of view, a firm with 
positive total accruals in t-1 and a positive change in total accruals in year t 
is increasing discretionary earnings by an increasing amount (income-
increasing earnings management). At the same time, firm with negative total 
accruals in t-1 and negative change in total accruals in year t is decreasing 
discretionary earnings by a decreasing amount (income-decreasing earning 
management).  
Using the change in total accruals (TA) as a dependent variable is akin to 
the test of the hypothesis that an increasing in firm’s market valuation 
strives to achieve or sustain earnings momentum through an increase in 
accruals. Thus, we used the change in total accruals from year t-1 to year t 
as the dependent variable of our regressions model and, we compute the 
following formula: 
 
    
change_TAijt =
(TAijt −TAijt−1)
Assetsijt  
 
where: TAijt is the total accruals for the firm i at year t; TAijt−1  is the total 
accruals for firm i at year t-1 and Assetsijt is the amount of the total assets 
for firm i at time t. 
 
As already explained, the aim of our study is to empirically analyse the 
relationship between firm’s market valuation and earnings management. As 
said before we use the change in total accruals from year t to year t-1 as a 
proxy for earnings management. However, one of the possible reasons of an 
increasing in total accruals should be an increasing in operation activities. In 
particular, in case of sales growth we can record a higher level of total 
accruals, without any relation with the discretionary accounting choice by 
the manager. At the same time, also the relation with the market-to-book 
could be better due to the sales growth.  
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Thus, in order to avoid the potential effect of the sales growth and, to make 
our results robust we run several robustness checks. In fact, we regress our 
hypotheses considering the change in discretionary accruals as estimated by 
Jones model (1991) as dependent variable. Using Jones model we avoid the 
effect the sales growth for both dependent and independent variable. Thus, 
the discretionary accruals component (abnormal accruals) is estimated as the 
difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals using the 
residual estimation of the error term of the regression. As we know from the 
literature, the residual coefficient of the following OLS regression can be 
used as proxy for discretionary accruals: 
 
   
CAijt
Assetsijt−1
= β1 jt
1
Assetsijt−1
"
#
$$
%
&
''+β2 jt
ΔSALESijt
Assetsijt−1
"
#
$$
%
&
''+εijt    
 
where:  
CAijt   represents the current accruals. They are equal to 
NIijt + depijt − (CFOijt ) ; where NIijt  is the net income for 
firm i at year t and represents income before extraordinary 
items (Datastream Datatype WC01551); depijt  is the 
depreciation and amortization for fir i at year t (Datastream 
Datatype WC01151) and CFOijt is the cash flow from 
operating activities for firm i at year t (Datastream Datatype 
WC04860). 
Assetsijt   represents total assets for firm i at year t (WC02999). 
  
ΔSALESijt  represents the change in sales for firm i from t-1 to t.  In 
particular, sales are computed considering gross sales and 
other operating revenues less discounts, returns and 
allowances (Datastream Datatype WC01001). 
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The residual estimation from the previous equation is used as proxy for 
discretionary current accruals  ( disCAijt ) for each firm-year observation. 
Then, using the same rational used for the total accruals, we test all the 
hypotheses considering the change in discretionary accruals from year t-1 to 
year t for each firm-year observation. Thus, firm with positive discretionary 
accruals in t-1 and a positive change in discretionary accruals in year t is 
increasing discretionary earnings by an increasing amount (income-
increasing earnings management). At the same time, firm with negative 
discretionary accruals in t-1 and negative change in discretionary accruals in 
year t is decreasing discretionary earnings by a decreasing amount (income-
decreasing earnings management). We compute the following formula as 
dependent variable for the robustness checks: 
     
    change_ disCAijt =
disCAijt − disCAijt−1
Assetsijt  
 
where: 
change_ disCAijt  represents the change in abnormal accruals (as 
computed through Jones model) for firm i from year 
t-1 to t. 
disCAijt  represents the abnormal accruals for firm i at year t. 
disCAijt−1  represents the abnormal accruals for firm i at year t-
1 
Assetsijt  represents the total assets for firm i at year t 
j  represents the industry. 
 
As we can see in the results section we compute our regressions first of all 
considering the entire sample (Panel A) and, then, splitting the sample 
between positive (Panel B) and negative (Panel C) change in total accruals 
and positive and negative change in discretionary accruals. The sub-sample 
of only positive (total and discretionary accruals) and only negative (total 
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and discretionary accruals) allow us to detect the trend of the two possible 
effects of accounting policies income-increasing (aggressive) and income-
decreasing (conservative) earnings management and their relationship with 
the firm’s market valuation. 
 
 
2.2. Independent variable: Change in Market to Book Ratio 
There is now considerable evidence that cross-sectional pattern of stock 
return can be explained by characteristics such as size, leverage, past 
returns, dividend-yield, earnings-to-price ratio and book-to-market ratio5. 
Fama and French examine all these variables (1992, 1996) simultaneously 
and conclude that, with the exception of the momentum strategy described 
by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns can be explained by only two of these characteristics, size and book-
to-market.  
Similarly, Lakonishock, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find that high market-
to-book “glamor stock” produce lower raw and size-adjusted returns than 
lower market-to-book firms. In particular, they suggest that the high returns 
associated with high market-to-book (or value) stocks are generated by 
investors who incorrectly extrapolate the past earnings growth rate of firms. 
They suggest that investors are overly optimistic about firms that have done 
well in the past and they are overly pessimistic about those that have done 
poorly. They also suggest that low book-to-market  (or growth) stocks are 
more “glamorous” than value stock and may thus attract naive investors 
who push up prices and lower the expected return of these securities.  
Finance and accounting literature provide several methods to measure 
firms’ market valuation.  
The most common is a methodology developed by Rhodhes-Kropf, 
Robinson and Viswanathan (2005, hereafter RKRV). The authors 
decomposed the market-to-book equity ratio into components, one related to 
                                                
5 The size anomalies was documented by Banz (1981) and Keim (1983), leverage by Bhanadari (1988), 
the past return effect by DeBondt (1983), the book-to-market effect byh Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, 
Reid, and Lastein (1985). 
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misevaluation and the other one related to growth options. In other words, 
this method produces a measure of misevaluation controlling for systematic 
differences in growth options among firms and industries. The 
decomposition proposed by RKRV has also been used in recent studies such 
has Hertzel and Li (2007) and Ma, Whidbee, and Zhang (2008). 
Based on this approach, a firm’s log market-to-book equity ratio (M/B) can 
be decomposed into two items: 
 
    ln(M / B) = ln(M /V )+ ln(V / B)  
 
where: M is the observed market value of equity and B is the book value of 
equity. V stands for the intrinsic value of equity, which is unobservable. 
Previous studies, for example Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999), Ang 
and Cheng (2006), and Dong, Hershleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), 
use a residual income model from the accounting literature to estimate V. 
However, the residual income model relies on a number of fairly restrictive 
assumptions, and, more importantly, the use of analyst forecasts (to 
compute residual income) could be bias (Lin, 2009).  
RKRV (2005) relax the residual income model and assume that a firm’s 
intrinsic value is a linear function of its book value equity, net income (i.e., 
the growth of book value of equity), and leverage. The parameters of the 
linear function are allowed to vary over time and across industries to reflect 
the variation of investment opportunities across times and industries. The 
parameters can also capture differences in discount rates among firms. 
Specifically, 
         
 ln(Mit ) =α0 jt +α1 jt ln(Bit )+α2 jt ln( NIit )+α3 jt I<0 ln( NIit )+α4 jtLEVit +εit  
 
NIit  stands for the absolute value of net income of firm I at time t. I<0 is an 
indicator variable which equals one for negative net income and zero 
otherwise. LEV is the market leverage ratio. εit  captures the deviation of 
intrinsic value of equity and, therefore, is a natural proxy for misevaluation.  
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Lin (2009) in his paper on the acquisition driven by stock overvaluation 
used the industry classification scheme developed by Fama and French 
(1997) to classified firms into 12 industries. They found similar results to 
RKRV (2005). These three variables, i.e. book value of equity, net income 
and leverage ratio are able to explain the within-industry cross-sectional 
variations of the market value with regression R2 over 80% for almost all 
industries. 
Following the previous framework and the empirical studies measuring 
firm’s market value we adopt market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the firm’s 
market valuation.  
We create a M/B portfolio considering the yearly market-to-book of each 
firms-industry observation. We compute the market-to-book (M/B) as the 
fiscal year-end share price divided by the fiscal year-end book value 
(Datastream Datatype PTBV).  
Then, in order to estimate increasing and decreasing in firm’s market value 
we create a portfolio considering the change in M/B from year t-1 to year t 
for each firm-year observation. In order to define our primary independent 
variable as a proxy for increasing and decreasing in firm’s market value, we 
compute the following formula: 
 
    change_M / Bijt =
Mijt −Mijt−1
Bijt−1
 
where : 
Mijt   represents the market value of firm i at year t; 
Mijt−1   represents the market value of firm i at year t-1; 
Bijt−1   represents the book value of firm i at year t-1; 
j   represents the industry. 
Lagged rankings are used to form portfolio because increasing and/or 
decreasing in firm’s market valuation is hypothesized to precede the 
incentive to manage earnings to meet or maintain earnings expectations. 
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2.3. Control Variables 
Our regression models also include factors that prior research has identified 
as impacting on earnings management, and in particular on variability in 
total accruals (and discretionary accruals for the robustness checks). Each 
control variable is discussed in the following section. 
o Firm size. Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that since larger 
companies are subject to greater scrutiny they are relatively more 
reluctant to manage earnings. Dechow and Dichev (2002) show that 
larger companies have better accrual quality when estimated as the 
residual from a model that regress current accruals onto current, 
lagged, and forward operating cash flows. Conversely, Cheng and 
Warfield (2005), Kadan and Yang (2005) pointed out that earnings 
management increase with big companies because size also brings 
political conflicts that could be mitigated by the achievement of 
better performances. To control for the controversial effects of 
firms’ size, we use the natural log of a firm’ s fiscal year-end total 
assets ( lnAssetsijt ). 
o Leverage. Given the debt instruments may include restrictive 
covenants that are tied to earnings and other financial metrics, 
managers of firms with level of debt may be motivated to mange 
earnings upward. Higher profits help to respect loan covenants 
(Cheng and Warfield, 2005).  As a firm’ s debt ratio increases, 
managers have an incentive to engage in earnings management 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Accruals have been found to be 
positively associated with debt levels (Press and Weintrop, 1990), 
and discretionary accruals are higher for firms near debt covenant 
violations (DeFond and Jimbalvo, 1994). However, there is also 
reason to expect that firm with more leverage will be bound 
contractually to apply accounting in a more conservative fashion 
(Watts, 2003a and 2003b). This could imply a sort of 
“unconditional” or news-independent conservatism (Ryan, 2006) 
that would generally reduce the incidence of positive discretionary 
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accruals. Pae (2007) provide evidence that firm with higher leverage 
exhibit more conservative accounting through discretionary accruals, 
and Astami and Tower (2006) find companies choosing income-
increasing accounting policies have less financial leverage. To 
control for the potential effect of debt level on accruals, we control 
for the variable LEV defined as a firm’s total liabilities divided by 
total assets, both measured at the end of fiscal year ( LEVijt ) 
o Company’ s performance. Kadan and Yang (2005) have shown that 
companies with poor performances in the previous year engage in 
earnings management practices to improve future results. Firms that 
are unable to meet last year’s earnings level may have the incentive 
to use discretionary accruals in an attempt to avoid earnings 
disappointments. To control for the possible effect of firm 
performance on earnings management practices, we include firm’s 
return on asset of prior year ROA. laggedROA is defined as income 
before extraordinary item divided by beginning of year assets (
laggedROAijt−1 ).   
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VI. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
1. Model Specification 
In order to test the relationship between firm’s market valuation and total 
accruals (H1) we use a panel data methodology considering 209 companies 
with observations from 1997 to 2010.  
Our dependent variable for the primary test is the change in total accruals 
from year t-1 to year t (change_TAijt ). 
We construct a firms’ portfolio considering as a proxy for the firms’ market 
valuation the change in market-to-book ratio. Our main independent 
variable is the ratio between the change in market value form year t-1 to 
year t and the book value at year t-1. In particular, we create a lagging 
portfolio of the fiscal year-end share prices divided by the fiscal year-end 
book value.  
Then, as already explained in the variables’ description section, we consider 
several other control variables ( lnAssets ; LEV ;ROA ). 
The following regression models, including also control variables, allow us 
to statistically test the relationship between changes in total accruals and 
change in market-to-book. 
 
 
Then, in order to test the relationship (H2a) between increasing in firm’s 
valuation and positive change in total accruals (meaning income-increasing 
earnings management) we create a portfolio of firms considering only those 
with positive change in total accruals from year t-1 to year t. We run the 
following regression model: 
 
 
Finally, in order to test the relationship (H2b) between decreasing in firm’s 
market valuation and negative change in total accruals (meaning income-
decreasing earnings management) we create a portfolio of firms considering 
change_TAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
+change_TAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
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only those with negative change in total accruals from year t-1 to year t. We 
run the following regression model: 
 
 
 
2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the 
primary regression tests, involving also the control variables.  
Panel A (representing the total sample) shows the descriptive statistics for 
the portfolio based on change in total accruals (change_TA) from year t-1 to 
year t. We provide mean, median, standard deviation, min and max, and 
number of observations for each variables included in the statistical test. As 
we can see from the table the median value of the change in firm’s market 
valuation (change_M/B) from year t-1 to year t is equal to -.03301. 
Panel B is composed by firms’ observation characterised by positive change 
in total accruals (+change_TA) from year t-1 to year t, representing the 
income-increasing earnings management portfolio. As we see from the table 
the median value for the variable change in firm’s market value from year t-
1 to year t (change_M/B) is equal to .00864. 
Panel C is composed by firms’ observation characterised by negative 
change in total accruals (-change_TA) from year t-1 to year t, representing 
income-decreasing earnings management portfolio. The median value for 
the variable change in firm’s market value from year t-1 to year t 
(change_M/B) is equal to -.14299. 
As we explained before, through Panel A we study the relation between 
firm’s market valuation and the earnings management phenomenon (total 
accruals used as earnings management proxy). 
Instead, Panel B and Panel C are created in order to study the relation 
between firm’s market valuation and the direction of the accounting 
manipulation. They represent respectively the income-increasing earnings 
management (Panel B) and income-decreasing earnings management (Panel 
C). 
−change_TAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
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The comparison among the descriptive statistics of the two panels provides 
a first cut of the interesting results that we will show in the primary tests 
section. As we see the median value of the variable change in firm’s market 
valuation in Panel B (that represent income-increasing accounting 
manipulation) is higher than the value of the variable change in firm’s 
market valuation in Panel C (that represent income-decreasing accounting 
manipulation). The value of the variable is respectively .00864 and -.14299. 
This means that in case of yearly positive change in total accruals the 
median value of the firm’s market valuation is higher than in case of yearly 
negative change in total accruals. The analysis on the mean value provides 
same results. 
 
 
 
 
Mean% Median Std%Dev Min Max N
change_TA .0007226 %3.0006586 .0916977 %3.2229756 .2723369 1962
change_M/B %3.0607715 %3.033001 1,101836 33,651605 3,139022 1863
lnAssets 12,93197 12,70004 1,854104 9,5828 17,71038 2360
laggedROA .0170198 .0206792 0.578115 %3.1838076 .1398961 2423
LEV .6161668 .6343437 .1843551 .1886658 .9624596 2446
Mean% Median Std%Dev Min Max N
6+change_TA .0668223 .0433318 .0684015 0 .2723369 977
change_M/B .0091244 .0086432 1,096997 33,651605 3,139022 1007
lnAssets 12,8639 12,6692 1,842749 9,5828 17,71038 1416
laggedROA .0122518 .0185406 .0615381 %3.1838076 .1398961 1442
LEV .6213807 .6394265 .0615381 .1886658 .9624596 1461
Mean% Median Std%Dev Min Max N
68change_TA %3.0648403 %3.0461278 .0589529 %3.2229756 %3.0006169 985
change_M/B %3.093187 %3.1429971 1,10248 33,651605 3,139022 856
lnAssets 12,74134 13,03409 1,867334 9,5828 17,71038 944
laggedROA .0231972 .0240284 .0510779 %3.1838076 .1398961 981
LEV .6084332 .6217086 .1821944 .1886658 .9624596 985
Notes:
Table&2:&Descriptive&statistics
Panel&A:&Descriptive&statistics&4&Change&in&Total&Accruals
Panel&B:&Descriptive&statistics&4&Income4Increasing&&Sample
Panel&C:&Descriptive&statistics&4&Income4Decreasing&Sample
This%table%presents%descriptive%statistics.%The%sample%period%is%from%1997%to%2010.%Panel%A%represents%the%change%in%total%accruals%portfolio.%Panel%B%
represents%the%income3increasing%earnings%management%portfolio%and%Panel%C%represents%the%income3decreasing%earnings%management%portfolio.%
For%each%of%the%three%panels%we%provide%mean,%median,%standard%deviation%(Std%Dev),%minimum%(Min),%maximum%(Max)%and%number%of%
observations%(N)%for%each%variable.
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Table 3 provides Pearson’ correlation matrix for each panel composition. 
Panel A provides the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for all the variables in 
our regression model for the sample of 1582 firm-year observations pooled 
over 1997 to 2010. 
As we see from the Panel A the Pearson correlation between change in total 
accruals (change_TA) and change in firm’s market value (change_M/B) is 
positive and significant (coefficient equals to .1351***). 
Panel B provides the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for all the variables in 
the panel representing income-increasing earnings management portfolio. 
The the sample is composed by 766 firm-year observations pooled over 
1997 to 2010. Also in Panel B the Pearson’s correlation between yearly 
positive change in total accruals (+change_TA) and firm’s market value 
(change_M/B) is positive and significant (coefficient: .0703**). 
Panel C provides the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for all the variables in 
the income-decreasing earnings management portfolio. The sample is 
composed by 816 firm-year observations pooled over 1997 to 2010. The 
Pearson’s correlation between yearly negative change in total accruals (-
change_TA) and firm’s market value (change_M/B) is positive and 
significant (coefficient equals to .1924***). 
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1 2 3 4 5
1 change_TA 1
2 change_M/B .1351*** 1
3 lnA ().02114 .0546** 1
4 ROA .1266*** .02570*** ().0072 1
5 LEV ().0066 ().0484 .0921*** ().3034*** 1
1 2 3 4 5
1 3+change_TA 1
2 change_M/B .0703** 1
3 lnA ().2191*** .0282 1
4 ROA ().2617*** .1340*** .0011 1
5 LEV .0396 (.0693** .0895*** ().2431*** 1
1 2 3 4 5
1 35change_TA 1
2 change_M/B .1924*** 1
3 lnA .2190*** .0844** 1
4 ROA .0562* .0861** ().0177 1
5 LEV ().0662** ().0254 .0998*** ().3726*** 1
Notes:
Table&3:&Correlations'&matrix
This(table(presents(the(Pearson's(correlation(coefficient.(The(sample(period(is(from(1997(to(2010.(Panel(A(
represents(the(change(in(total(accruals(portfolio.(Panel(B(represents(the(income)increasing(earnings(management(
portfolio(and,(Panel(C(represents(the(income)decreasing(earnings(management(portfolio.(
Variables
Variables
Panel&A:&Correlation&Matrix&6&Change&in&Total&Accruals
Variables
Panel&B:&Correlation&Matrix&6&Income6Increasing&earnings&management&(positive&change&in&total&accruals)
Panel&C:&Correlation&Matrix&6&Income6Decreasing&earnings&management&(negative&change&in&total&accruals)
 
 
 73 
VII. RESULTS 
 
1. Primary test – Changes in Total Accruals as a Dependent Variable 
All regression models are fixed effect models controlling for the industry-
year effect. Fixed effect model relaxes the assumption that the regression 
function is constant over time and space (Baum, 2006).  
In order to test the relation between firm’s market valuation and earnings 
management we use different model specifications. 
We found that the change_M/B coefficient is positive and significant in all 
specifications, suggesting a positive relation between the increasing 
(decreasing) firm’s market valuation from year t-1 to year t and increasing 
(decreasing) in earnings management (measured through total accruals), 
which is consistent with our expectation that managers handling overvalued 
(undervalued) companies have strong incentive to sustain overvaluation 
(undervaluation). In order to do that, and to avoid earnings surprise to the 
market, they manipulate accounting figures increasing (decreasing) the use 
of accruals accounting.  
 
Table 4 provides regression results for H1, H2a and H2b considering a 
period under observation from 1997 to 2010. 
Through Model 1 we tested the relationship between changes in total 
accruals from year t-1 to year t and change in market-to-book from year t-1 
to year t. The coefficient of the variable change_M/B is positive and 
significant (two-tailed p-value <0.01) supporting the hypothesis that the 
increasing in firm’s market valuation is associated to an increasing in total 
accruals.  
This result is consistent to Jensen (2005). Following Jensen 2005, when a 
listed company is overvalued, managers may have two choices: one is to 
report the profit lower than expected based on actual performance and, the 
other is to overstate the profit of the company to temporarily satisfy market 
expectation. Through Model 1 we support the prediction that when 
managers see an increasing in the firm’s market value of the company from 
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year t-1 to year t they have the incentive to perpetuate the positive market 
valuation engaging in accounting manipulation. 
This result is also coherent with the empirical evidence on the earnings 
momentum provide by Myers at al. (2006). They provide evidence on firms 
that report long “string of consecutive increases in earnings per share 
(EPS)”. They show that these firms consistently enjoy abnormally strong 
stock market performance over the period during which they report earnings 
strings, and that this performance is stronger for firms which report 
consistent increases in annual EPS, and the negative market reaction 
associated with the end of this string is more adverse for firms that have 
reported longer strings. They argue that these regularities provide managers 
with strong incentive to maintain and extend the earnings strings, and in 
extreme cases, this may lead to accounting frauds. They also pointed out 
that this phenomenon is likely to be attributable to earnings management, 
and provide evidence that managers of these firms exercise their financial 
reporting discretion to sustain and extend their firms’ earnings strings.  
Through Model 1 we provide quite similar evidence. In fact, the positive 
and significant relation between change in total accruals and change in 
market-to-book ratio means that managers with positive market valuation 
for at least two subsequent years use total accruals to sustain their firm’s 
valuation. 
The coefficients of the control variables have the expected sign and are 
consistent with findings in previous studies. As indicated by the negative 
and significant coefficient on laggedROA (two-tailed p-value <0.01) 
companies with poor performance in the previous year engage in earnings 
management practices in the subsequent year to improve future results. 
Consistent with the previous empirical studies we regress ROA at year t-1 
with the change in total accruals from t-1 to t. The negative sign of the 
coefficient shows that firms unable to meet last year’s earnings level may 
have incentive to use accruals to avoid earnings disappointments (Kadan 
and Yang (2005). At the same way, consistent with Astami and Tower 
(2006) our result confirms a negative and statistically significant relation 
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between financial leverage and earnings management (two-tailed p-value 
<0.01). Following Watts (2003a and 2003b) this result is consistent with the 
prediction that firm with more leverage will be bound contractually to apply 
accounting in more conservative way. So, from our result it seems that firms 
with high leverage exhibit more conservative accounting.  
 
Our tests are design to document evidence of both income-increasing and 
income-decreasing earnings management.  
As already explained in the model definition section, through Model 2 and 
Model 3 we split the sample between positive and negative change in total 
accruals. Through this design we have the opportunity to test the direction 
of earning manipulation and its relation with the market-to- book ratio.  
In particular, through hypothesis 2a and 2b we want to test the statistical 
significant relation between increasing firm’s market valuation (as a proxy 
for stock market overvaluation) and income-increasing earnings 
management (measured through positive change in total accruals) and, 
decreasing in firm’s market valuation (as a proxy for stock market 
undervaluation) and income-decreasing earnings management.  
Model 2 supports H2a. In Model 2 we change the dependent variable and, 
we run a regression considering Panel B, representing income-increasing 
earnings management portfolio (firm-year observations with positive 
change in total accruals, +change_TA). The coefficient of the variables 
change_M/B is still positive and significant (two-tailed p-value<0.01) 
supporting the hypothesis that an increasing in firm’s market value 
(overvaluation) induces managers to engage in income-increasing earnings 
management to sustain the overvaluation. Our results are coherent with 
previous empirical studies. First of all, they are coherent with Sloan 1996 
research in accounting accruals. He investigates the market price of total 
accruals and he finds that the market fails to appreciate the lower 
persistence of the accrual component of earnings and, consequently, 
overprices total accruals. Using quarterly data, Collins and Hirbar (2000) 
also find that the market overprices total accruals.  
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Moreover, this result is coherent also with Chi and Gupta (2007) that, using 
a sample composed by US listed companies, provide evidence that 
overvaluation is significantly related to subsequent income-increasing 
earnings management. 
Last but not least, the result is again coherent with the Jensen 2005 
prediction of “the agency costs of the overvalued equity”. If firms report 
market premium (positive market valuation for consequently years), their 
manager will be in a difficult situation once they realize that the market 
premium is not sustainable and, thus, they engage in increasingly aggressive 
accounting to match unrealistic expectations about their firm’s valuation.  
 
With reference to the control variables, the negative and significant 
coefficient of laggedROA confirms the prediction that companies with poor 
performance in the previous year engage in earnings management the 
following year, in particular in income-increasing earnings management to 
reach better results. In Model 2, instead, we obtain not significant result for 
the financial leverage (LEV) variable.   
 
Model 3 supports H2b. In Model 3 we change again the dependent variable 
and, we run a regression considering Panel C, representing income-
decreasing earnings management portfolio (firm-year observations with 
negative change in total accruals, -change_TA). 
The coefficient of the variable change_M/B is positive and significant (two-
tailed p-value<0.01) meaning that a decreasing in firm’s market valuation 
(decreasing of the market-to-book value from t-1 to t) is related to income-
decreasing earnings management (negative change in total accruals fro t-1 
to t). The result provides evidence that in case of firm’s undervaluation 
managers have incentive to sustain this decreasing engaging in income-
decreasing earnings management.  
In our opinion, this result could be related to the Badertscher (2010) 
findings on the overvaluation and choice of alternative earnings 
management mechanism. As said before he demonstrates the duration of 
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firm overvaluation is an important determinant of management’ s choice of 
alternative earnings management mechanism. 
Our empirical analysis suggests that in case of decreasing in firm’s market 
valuation managers of previous year overvalued (increasing in firm’s 
market valuation) companies engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management in order to correct previous upward accrual accounting 
manipulation, avoiding to engage in the extreme case of earnings 
management (non-GAAP earnings management) that induce accounting 
frauds.  
This result seems to be consistent to Lev (2012) predictions about 
mispricing and earnings restatement. Lev (2012) in his last book ranked 
companies within a large number of industries by their mean three-year 
Price to Earnings ratio (P/E) – an indicator of share overvaluation - in the 
early 2000s. Then, he classified the companies in each industry to five-equal 
size groups of ascending P/E size. Finally, he recorded for each P/E group 
the frequency of subsequent earnings restatement - an indicator of earnings 
manipulation or other accounting improprieties. From his analysis it is 
evident that the frequency of restatement increase monotonically with share 
valuation. So, the higher is the P/E groups the higher is the probability of 
earnings restatement (as a proxy of earnings manipulation). His result 
shows, at the same time, that the lower P/E group – likely undervalued share 
– also has a high frequency of earnings restatement. He argues “apparently, 
in their zeal to prop up lagging share prices, some managers of 
undervalued companies help themselves to accounting trickery” (Lev, 
2012).  
Our result seem to be quite similar, showing that decreasing in firm’s 
market valuation is also associate with earning management, in particular, 
with income-decreasing earnings management demonstrating that managers 
of undervalue companies may sustain the undervaluation to help themselves 
through accounting manipulation to correct accounting trickery. 
Attachment 2 provides the list of the firm-year observations that compose 
Panel B and Panel C. 
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To control for the controversial effects of the firms’ size we use the natural 
log of firm’ s fiscal end-year assets. For all models presented above the 
variable is not statistically significant. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table&4&(&Primary&Tests&regressions'&results&°
Incercept .08585*
(.04406)
change_M/B .00995***
(.00218)
lnAssets -..00218
(.00324)
laggedROA -..52008***
(.05286)
LEV -..08243***
(.02581)
F 30.96***
R2 .053
N 1582
Industry=year>fixed>effect yes
This-table-repots-the-results-of-our-test-of-H1,-H2a-and-H2b.-
For-H1-we-use-Model-1-and-we-run-the-following-regression:
For-H2a-we-use-Model-2-and-we-run-the-following-regression:
For-H2b-we-use-Model-3-and-we-run-the-following-regression:
°-all-the-variables-are-winsorized-at-the-2%-level-
Notes:-
Two.tailed-p.value-denoted-by-asteriks-are:-***less-than-1%;-*+-less-than-5%;-*-less-than-10%;-all-other-variables-
are-insignificant-with-p.value-grather-than-10%.
year>under>observation>from>1997>to>2010
change_TAdependent>variables
Model>1
.11942***
(.04282)
.00683***
(.00222)
-..00397
(.00315)
-..25243***
(.05030)
-..00540
(.02653)
9.07***
.13
766
yes
>+change_TA
Model>2
-..06454*
(.03726)
.00562***
(.00187)
.00245
(.00271)
-..11013**
(.05425)
-..02544**
(.02160)
4.39***
.047
816
yes
>=change_TA
Model>3
change_TAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
+change_TAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
−change_TAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
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2. Robustness checks  
We conduct the following sensitivity tests to examine the robustness of the 
results: alternative sample composition, additional dependent variables, and 
alternative model specification.  
 
2.1. Alternative sample composition 
To provide support for the interpretation of the results for change_M/B as 
consistent with the increasing in firm’s market valuation hypothesis, Table 5 
provides results considering different sample composition from Table 4.  
As we already said the primary results have been run considering 1582 
observations from 1997 to 2010, which is a very long time series. In order to 
check if the phenomenon could be influenced by different time series and, 
thus, it may have different behaviour considering different time period, we 
split our sample into two sub-samples.  
The first one is the “up-to-date sub-sample” composed by firm-year 
observations from 2005 to 2010. Model 4, 5, and 6 in Table 5 provide 
results for this sub-sample. The second one is the “old sub-sample” 
composed by firm-year observations from 1997 to 2004. Model 7, 8 and 9 
in Table 5 provide results for this second sub-sample.  
Running this analysis we have the opportunity to check if the relation 
between firms’ market valuation and earnings management is changed 
during the year and if we obtain alternative results from the primary one 
only considering different time series.  
Looking at Table 5 we see that the primary findings (showed in the previous 
section) are robust to these alternative sample composition.  
In Model 4 the positive and significant coefficient of the variable 
change_M/B (two-tailed p-value <0.01) shows that hypothesis 1 is 
supported for the period 2005-2010, meaning that also for the period 2005-
2010 an increase in firm’s market value is relate to an increase in total 
accruals. 
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The same model also confirms the results for the laggedROA. The 
coefficient is still negative and significant (two-tailed p-value <0.01) 
meaning that companies with poor performance in the previous year 
manipulate accruals accounting to get better results in the following year.  
Model 5 and Model 6 support respectively hypothesis 2a and 2b. They 
provide results, considering a time series from 2005 to 2010, for the 
predictions about the relation between firm’s market value and the earnings 
management direction (income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings 
management). In particular, Model 5 confirms that in case of increasing in 
firm’s market-to-book from year t-1 to year t mangers has strong incentive 
to engage in income-increasing earnings management; in case of 
undervaluation (decreasing in firm’s market-to-book from year t-1 to year t) 
mangers have incentive to engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management.  
As we can see from Table 5 also the prediction on the laggedROA is robust 
for different time series.  
Going back to old time series, analysing the results provided by Table 5 
(year under observation from 1997 to 2004) we see that the primary results 
are still robust. For Model 7, 8 and 9 the coefficient of the variable 
change_M/B is positive and statistically significant in all the specifications 
(two-tailed p-value <0.01 for Model 7; two-tailed p-value <0.1 for Model 8; 
two-tailed p-value <0.01 for Model 9). 
The results showed in Table 5 suggest that the predictions on the relation 
between firm’s market value and earnings management are not driven by 
different  time period under analysis.  
Moreover, as said before in 2005 many companies in the EU were required 
to issue their financial statement based on the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Then, since 2005 many companies in EU and 
in Italy change their accounting practices.  
The present robustness analysis confirming the results for both the period 
pre and post IFRS introduction in Europe, and thus in Italy, makes our 
predictions robust for this possible caveat. In fact, splitting the sample 
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between pre and post 2005 allow us to verify that the relation between 
firm’s market value and earnings management is not driven by different 
time series and by changes in accounting policies due to the IFRS 
introduction. 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Additional dependent variable – Changes in Discretionary Accruals 
The aim of the present study is to empirically demonstrate the relationship 
between firm’s market valuation (over-or undervaluation) and earnings 
management. As already explained and verified through the primary test we 
find a positive and statistically significant relation between change in firm’s 
market valuation from year t-1 to year t and the change in total accruals 
from year t-1 to year t. These results support the prediction that managers 
handling overvalued companies have strong incentives to support the 
overvaluation (or the increasing of the firm’s market value) engaging in 
earnings management.  
However, one of the possible reasons of an increasing in firm’s total 
accruals should be an increasing in operations activities, without any 
relation with the managerial discretion in the accounting choices. In this 
Table&5(&Alternative&sample&composition&regressions'&results
Incercept !".01701
(.14416)
change_M/B .00666***
(.00264)
lnAssets .07725
(.01091)
laggedROA !".69162***
(.06751)
LEV !".11164***
(.03856)
F 29.48***
R2 .061
N 999
Industry=year>fixed>effect yes
year>under>observation>from>2005>to>2010
Notes:!
Two"tailed!p"value!denoted!by!asteriks!are:!***less!than!1%;!*+!less!than!5%;!*!less!than!10%;!all!other!variables!are!insignificant!with!p"value!
grather!than!10%.
dependent>variables
Model>4
change_TA
.07212 !".06677 .1585** .22158** .4506
(.10558) (.10549) (.08840) (.08663) (.07192)
.00462* .00455** .01278*** .00843* .01308***
(.00263) (.00226) (.00459) (.00480) (.00380)
!".00123 .00430 !".00719 !".00461 !".00434
(.00799) (.00804) (.00609) (.00609) (.004806)
!".3664*** !".21453*** !".39694** .00904 !".38499***
(.0595) (!.06637) (.17728) (.18808) (.14343)
.01013 !".06865 !".10599 !".16430*** !".07765
(.03425) (.03039) (.06642) (.06272) (.05642)
10.97*** 4.51*** 3.69*** 3.13*** 4.65***
.182 .036 .011 .036 .008
551 559 472 215 257
yes yes yes yes yes
>+change_TA >=change_TA
year>under>observation>from>1997>to>2004
Model>7 Model>8 Model>9
change_TA >=change_TA
Model>5 Model>6
>+change_TA
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case, also the market-to-book ratio should be higher due to the sales growth. 
So, in order to examine the robustness of the primary results we consider the 
changes in discretionary accruals as a dependent variable (as estimated 
through Jones model (1991)). Using Jones model (1991) we control for the 
possible effect of the sales growth (McNichols, 2000). The discretionary 
accruals component is estimated as the difference between total accruals and 
non-discretionary accruals and, as explained in the variables’ description 
section, the estimation of the residuals (estimated for each firms-year 
observation) from Jones model is used as a proxy for discretionary accruals 
(measuring the level of accounting manipulation).  
The coefficient of the variable change in sales from t-1 to t 
(ΔSALES/Assets; two-tailed p-value <0.01) is positive and statistically 
significant. This result allows us to control the level of total accruals for the 
sales growth. Thus, estimating the residuals of the regression from the Jones 
model 1991, we clean the analysis from the sales growth, making the 
primary results even more robust. 
Then, to check the robustness of our findings considering the discretionary 
accruals rather than the total accruals, we run the following regressions’ 
equation: 
 
Equation’s check on hypothesis 1: 
 
 
Equation’s check on hypothesis 2a: 
 
 
Equation’s check on hypothesis 2b: 
 
 
Table 6 reports the results for Model 1, 2 and 3 using change in 
discretionary accruals (change_disCA) as dependent variable, while, we run 
the same independent variable used for the primary tests (change_M/B). 
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Results for change in discretionary accruals from year t-1 to year t are 
strongly supportive of primary findings. In Model 1 changes in 
discretionary accruals are positively related to changes in firm’s market 
valuation (two-tailed p-value <0.01). The results provided by Model 1 
strongly support our primary test on hypothesis 1.  
Model 1 also supports the result that we obtain in the primary test with 
reference to the control variables (laggedROA and LEV variables).  
As far as concern hypotheses 2a and 2b, Model 2 and 3 respectively support 
the results of the primary test. In fact, analysing the earnings management 
direction, using positive and negative change in discretionary accruals as 
proxy for income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management, 
we get positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable 
change_M/B. The results confirm that companies characterised by an 
increasing in the firm’s market value from year t-1 to year t engage in 
income-increasing earnings management (measured through positive change 
in discretionary accruals from year t-1 to year t as dependent variable).  
 
Model 3 provides results supporting H2b. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the variable change_M/B makes the hypothesis 
robust. Companies characterised by a decreasing in firm’s market value 
engage in income-decreasing earnings management (measured through 
negative change in discretionary accruals from year t-1 to year t as 
dependent variable). 
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2.3. Alternative model specification 
All the regression analyses are fixed effect model controlling for year-
industry effect. Given a panel data analysis (repeated observations on 
companies over years) the causal effect of firm’s market value on earnings 
management can be estimated treating the statistical analysis through a fixed 
Table&6&(&Changes&in&Discretionary&Accruals&regressions'&results
Intercept .03914
(.04442)
change_M/B .00487***
(.00200)
lnAssets .00063
(.00325)
laggedROA CD.29642***
(.05034)
LEV CD.07293***
(.02536)
F 11.40***
R2 .016
N 1530
IndustryDyearCfixedCeffect yes
ThisCtableCrepotsCtheCrobustnessCchecksCofCH1,CH2aCandCH2b.C
ForCH1CweCuseCModelC1CandCweCrunCtheCfollowingCregression:
ForCH2aCweCuseCModelC2CandCweCrunCtheCfollowingCregression:
ForCH2bCweCuseCModelC3CandCweCrunCtheCfollowingCregression:
°CallCtheCvariablesCareCwinsorizedCatCtheC2%ClevelC
Notes:C
TwoDtailedCpDvalueCdenotedCbyCasteriksCare:C***lessCthanC1%;C*+ClessCthanC5%;C*ClessCthanC10%;CallC
otherCvariablesCareCinsignificantCwithCpDvalueCgratherCthanC10%.
year%under%observation%from%1997%to%2010
Model%1
dependent%variables change_disCA
.08756**
(.03728)
.00371**
(.00181)
CD.00300
(.00272)
.00932
(.04231)
.01633
(.02238)
1.35
.029
751
yes
Model%2
%+change_disCA
CD.04941
(.03836)
.00460**
(.00184)
.00180
(.00280)
CD.14133***
(.05027)
CD.04965**
(.02192)
4.86***
.0007
779
yes
Model%3
%Achange_disCA
change_ disCAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
+change_ disCAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
−change_ disCAijt = β0 +β1change_M / Bijt +β2 lnAssetsijt +β3laggedROAijt−1 +β4LEVijt +εijt
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effect model (Wooldrige, 2009; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Assuming this 
model, we impose time independent effects for each observation that is 
possibly correlated with the regressors; in other words, the residuals for a 
given observation are not correlated across period. Due do the fact that 
panel data analysis implies repeated companies over time (so repeated 
observations over time), someone might argue that the statistical tests are 
significant just because the repeated observations are not independent. 
Assuming fixed effect model we control for the possible dependent 
observations bias in the results. 
Anyway, to make the statistical tests even more robust we run yearly OLS 
regression for several years, starting from the 2010, year with the higher 
number of observations. Attachment 3 presents the results for the yearly 
regression. As shown the coefficient of the independent variable of the 
primary test is still positive and statistically significant. This analysis makes 
the primary results robust to the possible dependent observations bias.  
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study explores the link between firm’s market value and earnings 
management incentives. In particular, we provide evidence consistent with 
the overvaluation hypothesis that predicts how managers of highly valued 
firms have strong incentive to manage earnings upwards. We demonstrate 
that an increasing in firm’s market value induce managers to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management. When managers see the firm’s 
market value going up they have the incentive to manipulate earnings 
upwards to sustain the increasing in firm’s market value.  
This result shows that the agency costs of overvalued companies proposed 
by Jensen (2005) also exist in Italy and, it is consistent with the existing 
literature in this field  (Collins and Hirbar, 2000; Myers et al., 2006; Chi and 
Gupta, 2007, Badrtscher, 2010). 
At the same time, our results show that a decreasing in firm’s market value 
is correlated to income-decreasing earnings management. This could mean 
that when managers see the firm’ s value going down they have incentive to 
manipulate earnings downward. In our opinion, this result is consistent with 
Badertscher’s finding (2010) about the degree and duration of overvaluation 
and alternative methods of managing earnings. In case of decreasing in 
firm’s market value managers of previous year overvalued companies 
engage in income-decreasing earnings management probably to correct 
(changing accruals accounting practice) previous upward accrual accounting 
manipulation, avoiding extreme forms of earnings management that are 
likely to induce accounting frauds. 
In our opinion, the overall results also confirm the Houmes and Skantz 
(2010) suggestion that market prices drive accruals in contrast to the typical 
model where accruals drive the market price.  
Moreover, we show that the primary test is robust to several sensitivities’ 
analysis. In particular, we verify the robustness of our results to different 
earnings management proxies; using discretionary accruals as estimated by 
Jones model (1991) rather than total accruals. 
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As pointed out by Marciukaityte and Varma (2007) and Lev (2012) and, as 
is even more widespread belief also in the academic debate, earnings 
restatement is the best way to measure earnings management because, by 
definition, is an admission by management that earnings were improperly 
reported. Even if we used different methods provided by the literature to 
measure earnings management phenomenon, they still have significant 
weaknesses. McNichols (2000) in his study about the “Research design 
issues in earnings management studies”, suggests that the aggregate accruals 
models that do not consider long-term earnings growth are potentially 
misspecified and can result in misleading inferences about earnings 
management behaviour (see: McNichols (2000) for the empirical issues 
about the earnings management proxies). We believe that this shortcoming 
is embedded into the methodology employed.  Maybe alternative statistical 
analysis considering earnings restatement cases rather than accruals 
methodology could provide more insight on the topic. Unfortunately, we 
can not apply this methodology for the Italian contest, because earnings 
restatements are not mandatory for European countries and, despite our 
attempt we found only 20 restatement’ cases in Italy. So, the lack of data 
makes statistical inferences impossible.  
We also have the ambition to extend the empirical analysis to other 
European countries in order to verify if the results could be generalized to 
others insider system (such as: Germany, France, Spain, etc…etc…). 
Despite the weakness related to the methodological approach, we think that 
the results of this research are relevant to understand managers’ behaviours 
in playing earnings management “game” and, in which extant it is 
important to improve efficiency of securities markets in order to protect 
investor’s interest.  
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